

International Comparative Research on Local Autonomy – Code book of the related variables (v6_temp2)

General explanations

Three reference variables regarding the 39 countries covered: **country_ID**, country_name and abbr_country.

Five main topics:

Local autonomy	1
Local democracy	14
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Topic	Sub-topic	Variable name	Code	Years covered	Nb of countries covered	Description
Local autonomy						
		Eleven variables measuring LA Source: LAI project 11 variables				

		Institutional depth (0-3) The extent to which local government is formally autonomous and can choose the tasks they want to perform	institutionaldepth_year	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	0 local authorities can only perform mandated tasks 1 local authorities can choose from a very narrow, predefined scope of tasks 2 local authorities are explicitly autonomous and can choose from a wide scope of predefined tasks 3 local authorities are free to take on any new tasks (residual competencies) not assigned to other levels of government
		Policy scope (0-4) (containing 12 functions and total) The extent to which local government is formally autonomous and can choose the tasks they want to perform	PS_Function_year	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Not at all; partly; fully responsible: Education (0-2) Social assistance (0-2) Health (0-2) Land-use (0-2) Public transport (0-1) Housing (0-1) Police (0-1) Caring functions (0-1)
		Effective political discretion (0-4) (containing 12 functions and total) The extent to which local government has real influence (can decide on service aspects) over these functions	EPD_Function_year	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	No, some, or real authoritative decision-making in: Education (0-2) Social assistance (0-2) Health (0-2) Land-use (0-2) Public transport (0-1) Housing (0-1) Police (0-1) Caring functions (0-1)
		Fiscal autonomy (0-4) The extent to which local government can independently tax its population	fiscalautonomy_year	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	0 local authorities do not set base and rate of any tax 1 local authorities set base or rate of minor taxes 2 local authorities set rate of one major tax (personal income, corporate, value added, property or sales tax) under restrictions stipulated by higher levels of government 3 local authorities set rate of one major tax (personal income, corporate, value added, property or sales tax) with few or no restrictions 4 local authorities set base and rate of more than one major tax (personal income, corporate, value added, property or sales tax)
		Financial transfer system (0-3) The proportion of unconditional financial transfers to total	financialtransfersystem_year	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	0 conditional transfers are dominant (unconditional = 0-40% of total transfers) 1 there is largely a balance between conditional and unconditional financial transfers (unconditional = 40-60%)

		financial transfers received by the local government				2 unconditional financial transfers are dominant (unconditional = 60-80%) 3 nearly all transfers are unconditional (unconditional = 80-100%)
		Financial self-reliance (0-3) The proportion of local government revenues derived from own/local sources (taxes, fees, charges)	financialselfreliance_year	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	0 own sources yield less than 10% of total revenues 1 own sources yield 10-25% 2 own sources yield 25-50% 3 own sources yield more than 50%
		Borrowing autonomy (0-3) The extent to which local government can borrow	borrowingautonomy_year	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	0 local authorities cannot borrow 1 local authorities may borrow under prior authorization by higher-level governments and with one or more of the following restrictions: a. golden rule (e. g. no borrowing to cover current account deficits) b. no foreign borrowing or borrowing from the regional or central bank only c. no borrowing above a ceiling, absolute level of subnational indebtedness, maximum debt-service ratio for new borrowing or debt brake mechanism d. borrowing is limited to specific purposes 2 local authorities may borrow without prior authorization and under one or more of a), b), c) or d) 3 local authorities may borrow without restriction imposed by higher-level authorities
		Organisational autonomy (0-4) The extent to which local government is free to decide about its own organisation and electoral system	organisationalautonomy_year	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Local Executive and election system: 0 local executives are appointed by higher-level authorities and local authorities cannot determine core elements of their political systems (electoral districts, number of seats, electoral system) 1 executives are elected by the municipal council or directly by citizens 2 executives are elected by the citizens or the council and the municipality may decide some elements of the electoral system Staff and local structures: Local authorities: Hire their own staff (0-0.5) Fix the salary of their employees (0-0.5)

						Choose their organisational structure (0-0.5)	Establish legal entities and municipal enterprises (0-0.5)
		Self-rule (0-28)	selfrulesindex_year	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	The overall self-rule enjoyed by local government in X country (the sum of all the indicators above)	
		Legal protection (0-3) Existence of constitutional or legal means to assert local autonomy	legalprotection_year	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	0 no legal remedy for the protection of local autonomy exists 1 constitutional clauses or other statutory regulations protect local self-government 2 local authorities have recourse to the judicial system to settle disputes with higher authorities (e.g. through constitutional courts, administrative courts or tribunals, or ordinary courts) 3 remedies of types 1 and 2 above, plus other means that protect local autonomy such as e.g. listing of all municipalities in the constitution or the impossibility to force them to merge	
		Administrative supervision (0-3) Unobtrusive administrative supervision of local government	administrativesupervision_year	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	0 administrative supervision reviews legality as well as merits/expediency of municipal decisions 1 administrative supervision covers details of accounts and spending priorities 2 administrative supervision only aims at ensuring compliance with law (legality of local decisions) 3 there is very limited administrative supervision	
		Central or regional access (0-3) To what extent local authorities are consulted to influence higher level governments' policy-making	centralorregionalaccess_year	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	0 local authorities are never consulted by higher level governments and there are no formal mechanisms of representation 1 local authorities are consulted and/or have access to higher-level decision-making through formal representation but influence is limited 2 local authorities are regularly consulted through permanent consultation channels and have substantial influence 3 local authorities are either consulted or have access to higher-level decision-making through formal representation; and substantial influence	
		Interactive rule (0-9)	interactiveruleindex_year	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	The overall interactive rule enjoyed by local government in X country (the sum of all the three indicators above)	
		Local autonomy (0-37)	LA_year	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	The combined autonomy of local authorities (the sum of all indicators)	

		Mean of Institutional depth	IDmean	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014)
		Mean of Policy scope	Psmean	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014)
		Mean of Effective political discretion	EPDmean	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014)
		Mean of Fiscal autonomy	Famean	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014)
		Mean of Financial transfer system	FTSmean	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014)
		Mean of Financial self-reliance	FSRmean	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014)
		Mean of Borrowing autonomy	Bamean	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014)
		Mean of Organisational autonomy	Oamean	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014)
		Mean of Self-rule	Srmean	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014)
		Mean of Legal protection	Lpmean	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014)
		Mean of Administrative supervision	Asmean	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014)
		Mean of Central or regional access	CRAmean	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014)
		Mean of Interactive rule	Irmean	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014)
		Mean of Local autonomy	Lamean	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014)

		Difference in Local autonomy from 1990 to 2014	LA_90_14	2014-1990	39 (34 in 1990)	
		Difference in % in Local autonomy from 1990 to 2014	LA_90_14pz	2014-1990	39 (34 in 1990)	
		Standardised institutional depth	Institutionaldepth_years	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Standardisation of the variables to a scale reaching from 0 to 100.
		Standardised PS_Total	PS_Total_years	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Standardisation of the variables to a scale reaching from 0 to 100.
		Standardised EPD_Total	EPD_Total_years	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Standardisation of the variables to a scale reaching from 0 to 100.
		Standardised fiscal autonomy	Fiscalautonomy_years	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Standardisation of the variables to a scale reaching from 0 to 100.
		Standardised financial transfer system	Financialtransfersystem_years	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Standardisation of the variables to a scale reaching from 0 to 100.
		Standardised financial self-reliance	Financialselfreliance_years	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Standardisation of the variables to a scale reaching from 0 to 100.
		Standardised borrowing autonomy	Borrowingautonomy_years	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Standardisation of the variables to a scale reaching from 0 to 100.
		Standardised organisational autonomy	Organisationalautonomy_years	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Standardisation of the variables to a scale reaching from 0 to 100.
		Standardised legal protection	Legalprotection_years	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Standardisation of the variables to a scale reaching from 0 to 100.
		Standardised administrative supervision	Administrative supervision_years	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Standardisation of the variables to a scale reaching from 0 to 100.
		Standardised central or regional access	Centralorregionalaccess_years	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Standardisation of the variables to a scale reaching from 0 to 100.
		Mean of standardised Institutional depth	institutionaldepth_smean	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014) of the standardised variables.

		Mean of standardised PS_Total	PS_Total_smean	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014) of the standardised variables.
		Mean of standardised EPD_Total	EPD_Total_smean	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014) of the standardised variables.
		Mean of standardised Fiscal autonomy	fiscalautonomy_smean	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014) of the standardised variables.
		Mean of standardised Financial transfer system	financialtransfersystem_smean	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014) of the standardised variables.
		Mean of standardised Financial self-reliance	financialselfreliance_smean	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014) of the standardised variables.
		Mean of standardised Borrowing autonomy	borrowingautonomy_smean	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014) of the standardised variables.
		Mean of standardised Organisational autonomy	organisationalautonomy_smean	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014) of the standardised variables.
		Mean of standardised Legal protection	legalprotection_smean	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014) of the standardised variables.
		Mean of standardised Administrative supervision	administrativesupervision_smean	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014) of the standardised variables.
		Mean of standardised Central or regional access	centralorregionalaccess_smean	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014) of the standardised variables.
		5 years period mean of Institutional depth	institutionaldepth_fiveyearsperiod_s	90-94, 95-99, 00-04, 05-09, 10-14	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of the variables for 5 periods of 5 years.
		5 years period mean of standardised Institutional depth	institutionaldepth_fiveyearsperiod	90-94, 95-99, 00-04, 05-09, 10-14	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of the standardised variables for 5 periods of 5 years.
		5 years period mean of PS Total	PS_Total_fiveyearsperiod_s	90-94, 95-99, 00-04, 05-09, 10-14	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of the variables for 5 periods of 5 years.

		5 years period mean of standardised PS Total	PS_Total_fiveyearsperiod	90-94, 95-99, 00-04, 05-09, 10-14	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of the standardised variables for 5 periods of 5 years.
		5 years period mean of EPD Total	EPD_Total_fiveyearsperiod_s	90-94, 95-99, 00-04, 05-09, 10-14	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of the variables for 5 periods of 5 years.
		5 years period mean of standardised EPD Total	EPD_Total_fiveyearsperiod	90-94, 95-99, 00-04, 05-09, 10-14	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of the standardised variables for 5 periods of 5 years.
		5 years period mean of Fiscal autonomy	fiscalautonomy_fiveyearsperiod_s	90-94, 95-99, 00-04, 05-09, 10-14	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of the variables for 5 periods of 5 years.
		5 years period mean of standardised Fiscal autonomy	fiscalautonomy_fiveyearsperiod	90-94, 95-99, 00-04, 05-09, 10-14	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of the standardised variables for 5 periods of 5 years.
		5 years period mean of Financial transfer system	financialtransfersystem_fiveyearsperiod_s	90-94, 95-99, 00-04, 05-09, 10-14	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of the variables for 5 periods of 5 years.
		5 years period mean of standardised Financial transfer system	financialtransfersystem_fiveyearsperiod	90-94, 95-99, 00-04, 05-09, 10-14	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of the standardised variables for 5 periods of 5 years.
		5 years period mean of Financial self-reliance	financialselfreliance_fiveyearsperiod_s	90-94, 95-99, 00-04, 05-09, 10-14	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of the variables for 5 periods of 5 years.
		5 years period mean of standardised Financial self-reliance	financialselfreliance_fiveyearsperiod	90-94, 95-99, 00-04, 05-09, 10-14	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of the standardised variables for 5 periods of 5 years.
		5 years period mean of Borrowing autonomy	borrowingautonomy_fiveyearsperiod_s	90-94, 95-99, 00-04, 05-09, 10-14	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of the variables for 5 periods of 5 years.

		5 years period mean of standardised Borrowing autonomy	<i>borrowingautonomy_fiveyearsperiod</i>	90-94, 95-99, 00-04, 05-09, 10-14	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of the standardised variables for 5 periods of 5 years.
		5 years period mean of Organisational autonomy	<i>organisationalautonomy_fiveyearsperiod_s</i>	90-94, 95-99, 00-04, 05-09, 10-14	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of the variables for 5 periods of 5 years.
		5 years period mean of standardised Organisational autonomy	<i>organisationalautonomy_fiveyearsperiod</i>	90-94, 95-99, 00-04, 05-09, 10-14	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of the standardised variables for 5 periods of 5 years.
		5 years period mean of Legal protection	<i>legalprotection_fiveyearsperiod_s</i>	90-94, 95-99, 00-04, 05-09, 10-14	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of the variables for 5 periods of 5 years.
		5 years period mean of standardised Legal protection	<i>legalprotection_fiveyearsperiod</i>	90-94, 95-99, 00-04, 05-09, 10-14	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of the standardised variables for 5 periods of 5 years.
		5 years period mean of Administrative supervision	<i>administrativesupervision_fiveyearsperiod_s</i>	90-94, 95-99, 00-04, 05-09, 10-14	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of the variables for 5 periods of 5 years.
		5 years period mean of standardised Administrative supervision	<i>administrativesupervision_fiveyearsperiod</i>	90-94, 95-99, 00-04, 05-09, 10-14	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of the standardised variables for 5 periods of 5 years.
		5 years period mean of Central or regional access	<i>centralorregionalaccess_fiveyearsperiod_s</i>	90-94, 95-99, 00-04, 05-09, 10-14	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of the variables for 5 periods of 5 years.
<p>Group of countries Sources: LAI project 11 variables; existing typologies</p>						
		Group of the countries covered	Country_group	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	11 Groups of countries on the basis of the 11 variables (RFS article): 1) German-speaking Mid-European countries; 2) Nordic countries; 3) Mediterranean countries; 4) Benelux countries; 5) British Isles; 6) Southern countries; 7) Central eastern countries; 8) Baltic countries; 9) Eastern countries; 10) Balkan countries; 11) Black Sea countries.

		Typology Hesse and Sharpe (1991)	Hesse_typo	1990-2014	11	<p>Three groups of local government systems:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Franco group 2) Anglo variant 3) North and Middle European variant <p>Source: HESSE, Joachim Jens and Laurence J. SHARPE (1991): Local Government in International Perspective: Some Comparative Observations. In: Joachim Jens Hesse (Ed.): Local government and Urban Affairs in International Perspective. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 603-621</p>
		Typology Loughlin et. Al. (2011)	Loughlin_typo	1990-2014	29	<p>Structuration of the book by European regional areas:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) The British Isles 2) The Rhinelandic States 3) The Nordic States 4) The Southern European States 5) The Visegrád States 6) The Baltic States 7) The Balkan States <p>Source: Loughlin, J., Hendriks, F. and Lidström, A., 2011. The Oxford Handbook of local and regional democracy in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press</p>
		Typology_Swianiewicz (2014)	Swianiewicz_typo	1990-2014	16	<p>Five types of Eastern local government systems:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Type 1 2) Type 2 3) Type 3 4) Type 4 5) Type 5 <p>Source: Pawel Swianiewicz (2014) An Empirical Typology of Local Government Systems in Eastern Europe, Local Government Studies, 40:2, 292-311</p>
		Year of EU membership	EU_membership_year	1958-2014	39	<p>Five accession waves to the European Union (own classification):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Founding states and early members, Western Europe (14 EU States) 2) Post 2004 members, 11 countries of Central and Eastern Europe + Cyprus, Malta 3) Candidate countries for EU accession (4 countries) 4) European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries (3 countries) 5) Non-EU countries (4 countries)

LAI and its seven composing dimensions Source: LAI Project: Local autonomy Index dimensions						
		Legal autonomy dimension The position given to the municipalities within the state	<i>D_LA_year</i>	2014, 2010, 2005, 2000, 1995, 1990	39 (34 in 1990)	$D_LA_year=100/3*\text{legalprotection_year}$
		Organisational autonomy dimension The extent to which local authorities are able to decide aspects of their political system and their own administration	<i>D_OA_year</i>	2014, 2010, 2005, 2000, 1995, 1990	39 (34 in 1990)	$D_OA_year=100/4*\text{organisationalautonomy_year}$
		Policy scope dimension The range of functions or tasks where municipalities are effectively involved in the delivery of services, be it through their own financial resources and/or through their own staff	<i>D_PS_year</i>	2014, 2010, 2005, 2000, 1995, 1990	39 (34 in 1990)	$D_PS_year=100/4*PS_Total_year$
		Effective political discretion dimension The range of tasks over which local government effectively has a say and whether it enjoys a general competence clause	<i>D_PD_year</i>	2014, 2010, 2005, 2000, 1995, 1990	39 (34 in 1990)	$D_PD_year=100/15*(\text{institutionaldepth_year} + 3*EPD_Total_year)$
		Financial autonomy dimension The combination of variables related to financial resources of local government giving them the possibility to influence their own budget	<i>D_FA_year</i>	2014, 2010, 2005, 2000, 1995, 1990	39 (34 in 1990)	$D_FA_year=100/24*(3*\text{fiscalautonomy_year} + 3*\text{financialselfreliance_year} + \text{borrowingautonomy_year})$
		Non-interference dimension The combination on the one hand of the importance given to the municipalities within the state and, on the other hand, the extent to which municipalities are	<i>D_NI_year</i>	2014, 2010, 2005, 2000, 1995, 1990	39 (34 in 1990)	$D_NI_year=100/6*(\text{financialtransfersystem_year} + \text{administrativesupervision_year})$

		controlled by higher levels of the state				
		Access dimension The extent to which municipalities are able to influence political decisions on higher levels	D_AC_year	2014, 2010, 2005, 2000, 1995, 1990	39	$D_AC_year = 100/3 * \text{central or regional access_year}$
		Local Autonomy Index (test)	LAI_year	2014, 2010, 2005, 2000, 1995, 1990	39	Without weighting $LAI_year = 100/71 * (2 * \text{legalprotection_year} + 3 * \text{organisationalautonomy_year} + 2 * \text{PS_Total_year} + 1 * \text{institutionaldepth_year} + 3 * \text{EPD_Total_year} + 3 * \text{fiscalautonomy_year} + 3 * \text{financialselfreliance_year} + 1 * \text{borrowingautonomy_year} + 1 * \text{financialtransfersystem_year} + 1 * \text{administrativesupervision_year})$.
		Local Autonomy Index	D_LAI_year	2014, 2010, 2005, 2000, 1995, 1990	39	$D_LAI_year = (1 * D_LA_year + 2 * D_OA_year + 2 * D_PS_year + 3 * D_PD_year + 3 * D_FA_year + 1 * D_CRC_year + 1 * D_AC_year) / 13$
		5 years period mean of standardised and weighted Legal autonomy	D7w_legalautonomy_fiveyearsperiod_s	90-94, 95-99, 00-04, 05-09, 10-14	39 (34 in 1990)	Legal autonomy: the legal status and protection of local governments (= legal protection); Average of the standardised and weighted dimensions for 5 periods of 5 years.
		5 years period mean of standardised and weighted Political discretion	D7w_politicaldiscretion_fiveyearperiod_s	90-94, 95-99, 00-04, 05-09, 10-14	39 (34 in 1990)	Political discretion: the formal distribution of power and the effective decision-making competences with respect to services delivery = (institutional depth + 3*effective political discretion)/4; Average of the standardised and weighted dimensions for 5 periods of 5 years.
		5 years period mean of standardised and weighted Policy scope	D7w_policyscope_fiveyearsperiod_s	90-94, 95-99, 00-04, 05-09, 10-14	39 (34 in 1990)	Policy scope: the scope of services for which local governments are responsible (= policy scope); Average of the standardised and weighted dimensions for 5 periods of 5 years.
		5 years period mean of standardised and weighted Financial autonomy	D7w_financialautonomy_fiveyearperiod_s	90-94, 95-99, 00-04, 05-09, 10-14	39 (34 in 1990)	Financial autonomy: the financial resources available locally and the possibility to decide on their sources = (3*fiscal autonomy + 3*financial self-reliance + 1*borrowing autonomy)/7; Average of the standardised and weighted dimensions for 5 periods of 5 years.
		5 years period mean of standardised and weighted Organisational autonomy	D7w_organisationalautonomy_fiveyearsperiod_s	90-94, 95-99, 00-04, 05-09, 10-14	39 (34 in 1990)	Organisational autonomy: the free organisation of local political arenas and administration (= organisational autonomy); Average of the standardised and weighted dimensions for 5 periods of 5 years.

		5 years period mean of standardised and weighted Non-interference	D7w_noninterference_fiveyearsperiod_s	90-94, 95-99, 00-04, 05-09, 10-14	39 (34 in 1990)	Non-interference: the extent of liberty left by higher levels of government in their control = (financial transfer system + administrative supervision)/2; Average of the standardised and weighted dimensions for 5 periods of 5 years.
		5 years period mean of standardised and weighted Access	D7w_access_fiveyearsperiod_s	90-94, 95-99, 00-04, 05-09, 10-14	39 (34 in 1990)	Access: the degree of influence of local governments on political decisions at higher levels of government (= central or regional access); Average of the standardised and weighted dimensions for 5 periods of 5 years.
		Mean of standardised and weighted Legal autonomy	D7w_legalautonomymeans	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014) of the standardised and weighted dimensions
		Mean of standardised and weighted Political discretion	D7w_politicaldiscretionmeans	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014) of the standardised and weighted dimensions
		Mean of standardised and weighted Policy scope	D7w_policyscopemeans	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014) of the standardised and weighted dimensions
		Mean of standardised and weighted Financial autonomy	D7w_financialautonomymeans	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014) of the standardised and weighted dimensions
		Mean of standardised and weighted Organisational autonomy	D7w_organisationalautonomymeans	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014) of the standardised and weighted dimensions
		Mean of standardised and weighted Non-interference	D7w_noninterferencemeans	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014) of the standardised and weighted dimensions
		Mean of standardised and weighted Access	D7w_accessmeans	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Average of all countries (1990-2014) of the standardised and weighted dimensions
		5 years period mean of the LAI (with standardised and weighted dimensions)	LAI_Index_D7w_fiveyearsperiod	90-94, 95-99, 00-04, 05-09, 10-14	39 (34 in 1990)	Weighed and standardized LAI (means, five-year periods)
		Mean of the LAI (with standardised and weighted dimensions)	LAI_Index_D7w_means	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	Weighed and standardized LAI means
		LAI changes from 1990-1994 to 1995-1999	LAI_Index_D7w_1_5	1995-1999-1990-1994	39 (34 in 1990)	LAI changes first to fifth five-year periods

		Index of local autonomy constructed through a simple aggregation of the eleven variables (last period and mean)	LA_Index_V11_10_14	2010-2014	39	First construction variant (see Ladner, Andreas & Nicolas Keuffer 2018 Creating an index of local autonomy – theoretical, conceptual, and empirical issues, Regional & Federal Studies)
		Index of local autonomy constructed through a simple aggregation of the eleven variables (means)	LA_Index_V11means	1990-2014	39 (34 in 1990)	First construction variant (see Ladner, Andreas & Nicolas Keuffer 2018 Creating an index of local autonomy – theoretical, conceptual, and empirical issues, Regional & Federal Studies)
		Standardised and weighted Legal autonomy	D7w_legalautonomy2014s	2014	39	Standardised and weighted dimensions
		Standardised and weighted Political discretion	D7w_politicaldiscretion2014s	2014	39	Standardised and weighted dimensions
		Standardised and weighted Policy scope	D7w_policyscope2014s	2014	39	Standardised and weighted dimensions
		Standardised and weighted Financial autonomy	D7w_financialautonomy2014s	2014	39	Standardised and weighted dimensions
		Standardised and weighted Organisational autonomy	D7w_organisationalautonomy2014s	2014	39	Standardised and weighted dimensions
		Standardised and weighted Non-interference	D7w_noninterference2014s	2014	39	Standardised and weighted dimensions
		Standardised and weighted Access	D7w_access2014s	2014	39	Standardised and weighted dimensions
		LAI with standardised and weighted variables and dimensions	LAI_Index_D7w_2014	2014	39	Third construction variant (see Ladner, Andreas & Nicolas Keuffer 2018 Creating an index of local autonomy – theoretical, conceptual, and empirical issues, Regional & Federal Studies)
Local democracy						
	Quality of democracy_Freedom					
	Source: Democracy Barometer					

		Constitutional provisions guaranteeing physical integrity	IL_PHIN1_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 26	<p>Consttort (0-2): Existence of constitutional provisions banning torture or inhumane treatment. In case there are no constitutional provisions, the signing of binding international treaties was also considered. Categories: 0 = neither mentioned in constitution nor signed a binding treaty; 1 = either mentioned in constitution with reservations, or signed a binding treaty, or signed ECPHRFF with reservation clause; 2 = explicitly mentioned in constitution without reservations, or signed ECPHRFF without reservations. Source(s): CON, DAP, ECPHRFF, IAPPT, ACHPR, ACHR, CTOCIDTP, CCP.</p> <p>Convort (0-1): Ratification of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Categories: 0 = Not ratified; 1 = Ratified. Source(s): HDR.</p>
		No transgressions by the state	IL_PHIN2_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 26	<p>Politerr (0-5): Political Terror Scale (reversed) Categories: 1 = Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare; 2 = There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected and torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare; 3 = Here is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted; 4 = Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas. 5 = terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals. Source(s): PTS.</p> <p>Torture (0-2): Torture and other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment. Torture refers to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, by government officials or by private individuals at the instigation of government officials. Torture includes the use of physical and other force by police and prison guards that is cruel, inhuman, or degrading. Torture can be anything from simple beatings, to other practices such as rape or administering shock or electrocution as a means of getting information, or a forced confession. Coding is based on US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and Amnesty International's Annual Reports. Categories: 0 = practiced frequently (50 or more incidents); 1 = practiced occasionally (1 to 49 incidents); 2 = not practiced (no incidents). Source(s): CIRI.</p>

		Mutual acceptance of right to physical integrity by citizens	IL_PHIN3_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 25	Homicide (-91.6-0): Number of homicides per 100'000 capita (reversed). Source(s): EUROSTAT, UNODC, WB, WHO, Wikipedia. Riot (-15-0): Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force (reversed). Source(s): BCNTS.
		Right to physical integrity	IL_PHIN_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 25	Component
		Constitutional provisions guaranteeing right to freedom of conduct of life	IL_SELFU1_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 26	Constrel (0-2): Existence of constitutional provisions protecting religious freedom. In case there are no constitutional provisions, the signing of binding international treaties was also considered Categories: 0 = neither mentioned in constitution nor signed a binding treaty; 1 = either mentioned in constitution with reservations, or signed a binding treaty, or signed ECPHRFF with reservation clause; 2 = explicitly mentioned in constitution without reservations, or signed ECPHRFF without reservations. Source(s): CON, DAP, ECPHRFF, ICCPR, ACHPR, ACHR; CCP. Constfreemov (0-1): This variable measures, whether constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of movement exist. In case there are no constitutional provisions, the signing of binding international treaties was also considered. Categories: 0 = neither mentioned in constitution nor signed a binding treaty; 1 = constitutional guarantees provided or signed a binding treaty. Source(s): CON, ECPHRFF, ICCPR, UNUDHR; CCP.
		Freedom of conduct of life	IL_SELFU2_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 26	Freerelig (0-2): This variable indicates the extent to which the freedom of citizens to exercise and practice their religious beliefs is subject to actual government restrictions. Does the government respect rights including the freedom to publish religious documents in foreign languages? Does religious belief affect membership in a ruling party or a career in government? Does the government prohibit promotion of one religion over another and discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief? Does the government restrict the teaching or practice of any faith? Does the government discriminate against minority religious groups? Coding is based on US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Categories: 0 = Yes, there are severe restrictions on religious practices by the government; 1 = restrictions are moderate. 2 = there are no restrictions Source(s): CIRI. Freemove (0-2): This variable indicates the extent to which governments restrict the freedom of citizens to travel within or leave their own country of birth or the movement of certain groups based on political or religious grounds. It also captures the extent to which there are restrictions on the duration of stay abroad, whether citizens lose their property and other assets if they leave for a very long

						<p>time, whether some citizens have to get permission to leave or when they leave, are not allowed to return. Coding is based on US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.</p> <p>Categories: 0 = freedom of movement is severely restricted; 0.5 = intermediate category; 1 = freedom of movement is somewhat restricted; 1.5 = intermediate category; 2 = freedom of movement is unrestricted</p> <p>Source(s): CIRI.</p>
		Effective property rights	IL_SELFU3_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 35; 24	<p>Proprietary (0-95): This variable measures the degree to which a country's laws protect private property rights and the degree to which its government enforces those laws. The more certain the legal protection of property, the higher a country's score; similarly, the greater the chances of government expropriation of property, the lower a country's score. Coding is based on the following sources of information: Economist Intelligence Unit, U.S. Department of Commerce and Country Reports on Human Rights Practices by the U.S. Department of State.</p> <p>Categories: 100 = Private property is guaranteed by the government. The court system enforces contracts efficiently and quickly. The justice system punishes those who unlawfully confiscate private property. There is no corruption or expropriation; 90 = Private property is guaranteed by the government. The court system enforces contracts efficiently. The justice system punishes those who unlawfully confiscate private property. Corruption is nearly non-existent, and expropriation is highly unlikely; 80 = Private property is guaranteed by the government. The court system enforces contracts efficiently but with some delays. Corruption is minimal, and expropriation is highly unlikely; 70 = Private property is guaranteed by the government. The court system is subject to delays and is lax in enforcing contracts. Corruption is possible but rare, and expropriation is unlikely; 60 = Enforcement of property rights is lax and subject to delays. Corruption is possible but rare, and the judiciary may be influenced by other branches of government. Expropriation is unlikely; 50 = The court system is inefficient and subject to delays. Corruption may be present, and the judiciary may be influenced by other branches of government. Expropriation is possible but rare; 40 = The court system is highly inefficient, and delays are so long that they deter the use of the court system. Corruption is present, and the judiciary is influenced by other branches of government. Expropriation is possible; 30 = Property ownership is weakly protected. The court system is highly inefficient. Corruption is extensive, and the judiciary is strongly influenced by other branches of government. Expropriation is possible; 20 = Private property is weakly protected. The court system is so inefficient and corrupt that outside settlement and arbitration is the norm. Property rights are difficult to enforce. Judicial corruption is extensive. Expropriation is common; 10 = Private property is rarely protected, and almost all property belongs to the state. The country is in such chaos (for example, because of ongoing war) that protection of property is almost impossible to enforce. The judiciary is so corrupt that property is not protected effectively. Expropriation is common; 0 = Private property is outlawed, and all property belongs to the state. People do</p>

						<p>not have the right to sue others and do not have access to the courts. Corruption is endemic. Source(s): IEF.</p> <p>Secprop (0.11-9.72): Assessment of whether personal security and private property are adequately protected. Measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 10. Source(s): IMD; WGI.</p>
		Right to free conduct of life	IL_SELFU_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 35; 24	Component
		Individual liberties	INDLIB_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 35; 24	Function
		Constitutional provisions for impartial courts	RL_EQL1_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 26	<p>Constfair (0-4): Constitutional provisions for fair organization of court system (no exceptional courts and hierarchical judicial system). Sum of two constitutional guarantees: Source(s): DAP, CCP.</p> <p>Pubtrial (0-2): Existence of constitutional provisions guaranteeing a public trial. Source(s): DAP, CCP.</p>
		Effective independence of the judiciary	RL_EQL2_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 35; 23	<p>Judindepcor (0-2): Judicial independence: This variable documents the level of independence in the Judiciary, as reported by the Annual Human Rights Reports of the Department of State (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor). Categories: 0 = Non-independent judiciary: The judiciary is described as non-independent; as having significant levels of executive influence or interference, or as having high levels of corruption; 1 = Somewhat Independent Judiciary: The judiciary is described as somewhat independent, with pressure from the executive branch “at times,” or with occasional reports of corruption; 2 = Independent Judiciary: The judiciary is described as “generally independent” or as independent in practice with no mention of corruption or outside influences. Source(s): DAP, CIRI.</p> <p>Judindepinf (1.20-6.89): Assessment of the independence of the judiciary: “The judiciary in your country is independent and not subject to interference by the government and/or parties to the dispute.” Measured on a scale ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (7). Source(s): GCR.</p>
		Effective impartiality of the legal system	RL_EQL3_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	36 (GEO, LIE and MKD)	Impcourts (1.42-6.8): Impartial Courts: This component is from the Global Competitiveness Report’s question: “The legal framework in your country for private businesses to settle disputes and challenge the legality of government actions and/or regulations is inefficient and subject to manipulation (= 1) or is

					missing); 36; 34; 24	<p>efficient and follows a clear, neutral process (= 7)." This is recoded into a scale ranging from 0 to 10. Source(s): GCR, WGI.</p> <p>Intgrlegal (0-6): This component is based on the International Country Risk Guide's Political Risk Component I for Law and Order: "The 'law' sub-component assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal system". Measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 6. Source(s): ICRG.</p>
		Equality before the law	RL_EQL_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	36 (GEO, LIE and MKD missing); 36; 34; 23	Component
		Constitutional provisions for judicial professionalism	RL_QUAL1_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 26	<p>Profjudg (0-1): Professionalism (law degree, professional experience) is a precondition for appointment of judges to highest courts. Categories: 0 = No constitutional provision exists; 1 = Constitutional provision exists. Source(s): Kritzer et al. (2002).</p> <p>Prof tenure (0-1): Professionalism of judges concerning length of tenure. Professionalism is high, if tenure is not restricted, i.e. if it is lifelong. Categories: 0 = Tenure is restricted; 0.5 = Tenure is explicitly restricted to a certain retirement age; 1 = no restriction; lifelong tenure.</p>
		Confidence in the justice system	RL_QUAL2_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 25	<p>Confjust (12.36-87.54): Confidence in the legal system: Share of survey respondents indicating high confidence/trust. Source(s): their calculation based on AfB, AsB, AsnB, EB, ESS, ISS, LAPOP, LB, WVS.</p> <p>Fairjust (0-9.40): Assessment of the confidence in the fair administration of justice in the society. Measured on a scale ranging from "There is no confidence in the fair administration of justice in the society" (1) to "There is full confidence in the fair administration of justice in the society" (6). This is recoded into a scale ranging from 0 to 10. Source(s): IMD; WGI.</p>
		Confidence in the police	RL_QUAL3_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 35; 25	<p>Confpolice (11.71-92.93): Confidence in the police: Share of survey respondents indicating high confidence/trust. Source(s): their calculation based on AfB, AsB, AsnB, EB, ESS, LAPOP, LB, WVS.</p> <p>Fairpolice (1.7-6.84): Assessment of reliability/effectiveness of the police services: 1998-1999: "The police in your country effectively safeguard personal security so that it is an important consideration in business activity", "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (7). / 2000: "Private business can rely on police for protection", "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (7). / 2002-</p>

						2008: "Police services can- not be relied upon to protect business from criminals" (1) to "can be relied on to protect business from criminals". Source(s): GCR.
		Quality of the legal system	RL_QUAL_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 35; 24	Component
		Rule of law	RULEOFLAW_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	36 (GEO, LIE and MKD missing); 36; 34; 23	Function
		Constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom to associate	PS_FRAS1_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 26	<p>Constfras (0-2): Freedom of Association: This variable documents the existence of constitutional provisions regarding freedom of association. In case there are no constitutional provisions, the signing of binding international treaties was also considered. Source(s): DAP, CON, ICESCR, ICCPR, ACHR, ECPHRFF, CCP.</p> <p>Constass (0-2): Freedom of Assembly: This variable documents the existence of constitutional provisions protecting the freedom of assembly. In case there are no constitutional provisions, the signing of binding international treaties was also considered. Categories: 0 = neither mentioned in constitution nor signed a binding treaty; 1 = either mentioned in constitution with reservations, or signed a binding treaty, or signed ECPHRFF with reservation clause; 2 = explicitly mentioned in constitution without reservations, or signed ECPHRFF without reservations. Source(s): DAP, CON, ICESCR, ICCPR, ACHR, ECPHRFF, CCP.</p>
		Degree of association (economic interests)	PS_FRAS2_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	36 (GEO, LIE and MKD missing); 36; 34; 25	<p>Union (2-99.07): Freedom of Assembly: This variable documents the existence of constitutional provisions protecting the freedom of assembly. In case there are no constitutional provisions, the signing of binding international treaties was also considered. Source(s): Visser (2009), GURN, ILO, OECD, Eurofund, Blanchflower (2006), Golden&Wallerstein (2006), McGuire (1999).</p> <p>Memproorg (0.41-97.61): Membership in professional organizations. Share of survey respondents indicating that they are member in a professional organization. Source(s): own calculation based on AfB, EB, ESS, CSES, WVS.</p>
		Degree of association (public interests)	PS_FRAS3_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 25	<p>Memhuman (0.15-41.23): Membership in humanitarian organizations. Share of survey respondents indicating that they are member in and/or active for a humanitarian organization. Source(s): their calculation based on WVS, ESS, EB, LB.</p>

						Memenviron (0.20-59.4): Membership in environmental/animal rights organizations. Share of survey respondents indicating that they are member in and/or active for an environmental/animal rights organization. Source(s): their calculation based on WVS, EB, ESS, LB.
		Freedom to associate	PS_FRAS_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	36 (GEO, LIE and MKD missing); 36; 34; 25	Component
		Constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of speech	PS_FROP1_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 26	<p>Constspeech (0-2): Freedom of Speech: This variable documents the existence of constitutional provisions concerning freedom of speech. In case there are no constitutional provisions, the signing of binding international treaties was also considered. Categories: 0 = neither mentioned in constitution nor signed a binding treaty; 1 = either mentioned in constitution with reservations, or signed a binding treaty, or signed ECPHRFF with reservation clause; 2 = explicitly mentioned in constitution without reservations, or signed ECPHRFF without reservations. Source(s): DAP, CON, ICESCR, ICCPR, ACHR, ECPHRFF, CCP.</p> <p>Constpress (0-2): Freedom of the press: This variable documents the existence of constitutional provisions concerning the freedom of the press. In case there are no constitutional provisions, the signing of binding international treaties was also considered. Categories: 0 = neither mentioned in constitution nor signed a binding treaty; 1 = either mentioned in constitution with reservations, or signed a binding treaty, or signed ECPHRFF with reservation clause; 2 = explicitly mentioned in constitution without reservations, or signed ECPHRFF without reservations. Source(s): DAP, CON, ICESCR, ICCPR, ACHR, ECPHRFF, CCP.</p>
		Media offer	PS_FROP2_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 24	<p>Newsimp (5.87-0.39): Import of newspapers, journals and periodicals in % of GDP (in current US dollars). Source(s): their calculation based on WB, WPT, CD.</p> <p>Newspaper (0.3-56.93): Number of (paid and free) daily newspaper titles per 1 million inhabitants. Source(s): their calculation based on WB, WPT.</p>
		Political neutrality of press system	PS_FROP3_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	34; 35; 34; 24	Balpress (-2.5-0): Ideological balance of the press system (regional and national newspapers). Calculated as follows: (1) Each newspaper listed by the BPHW is assigned a value between 1 to 6 indicating its commitment or affiliation to a certain political ideology or party (on the basis of information from BPHW). These are Manifesto codes: 1 to 3 represent the left side of the political spectrum, 4 to 6 the right side. Newspapers listed as "independent" are considered neutral, i.e. internally diverse, and therefore receive the value for the exact centre of the political spectrum: 3.5. Also, newspapers listed in the BPHW

						<p>without indication of a political orientation are considered as independent. (2) Each code is then multiplied by the respective newspaper's circulation so that smaller newspapers receive less weight (non-dailies' circulation was adjusted accordingly). If information on a paper's circulation is missing, it is replaced by either the paper's circulation of previous or preceding years or by the average circulation of the corresponding country and year. (3) Finally, the weighted codes are aggregated (average) per country and year. The values of Balpress reflect the absolute deviance of these aggregate scores from the neutral value 3.5, multiplied by -1.</p> <p>Source(s): their coding and calculation based on Blum (2005), BPHW, HBI, Kelly et al. (2004), MT, Østergaard (1992), Voltmer (2000), WP, Wikipedia.</p> <p>Neutrnp (0-100): Share of neutral / independent newspapers' circulation (weighted by frequency of publication) of a country's total newspaper circulation in %. Neutral newspapers = papers with value 3.5 in Balpress. Source(s): their coding and calculation based on Blum (2005), BPHW, HBI, Kelly et al. (2004), MT, Østergaard (1992), Voltmer (2000), WP, Wikipedia.</p>
		Freedom of opinion	PS_FROP_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	34; 35; 34; 24	Component
		Public sphere	PUBLIC_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	34; 35; 34; 24	Function
		Freedom	FREEDOM_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	34; 35; 33; 23	Principle
<p>Quality of democracy_Control Source: Democracy Barometer</p>						
		Formal rules for competitiveness	CO_COMP1_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 26	<p>Meandistrict (1-150): Natural log (ln) of mean district magnitude in lower parliamentary chamber at the highest level of seat allocation. Source(s): DPI; IPU; ACE; Katz 2001; 2006; Nohlen et al. 1999; 2001; Nohlen 2004; 2005.</p> <p>Gerryman (0-3): Possibilities to delimit electoral districts; categories: 3 = no possibility; 2 = body responsible for drawing the boundaries is NOT executive or legislative; 1 = legislative is responsible for drawing the boundaries; 0 = executive is responsible for drawing the boundaries. When several bodies (e.g. legislative and bounding commission) take the lowest value (e.g. legislative = 1). Source(s): ACE.</p>

		Closeness of electoral outcomes	CO_COMP2_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 25	Largpavo (14.51-99.23): Margin of electoral concentration of votes. Calculated as 100% - pstrongest, where pstrongest = percentage of votes obtained by strongest party. Source(s): WZB, Nohlen et al. 2001, Nohlen et al. 1995. Votediff (40.92-99.99): 100 — [Difference between largest and second largest lower house party in % of all votes]. Source(s): WZB, Nohlen et al. 2001, Nohlen et al. 1995.
		Low concentration of seats	CO_COMP3_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 25	Herfindex (-0.93—0.09): Herfindahl index: the sum of the squared seat shares of all parties in the lower house of parliament. Measures the degree of concentration (reversed). Source(s): Their calculations based on data from the WZB Seatdiff (0-100): Difference between largest and second largest lower house party in % of all seats (re-versed). Source(s): WZB, Nohlen et al. 2001.
		Vulnerability (competitiveness of elections)	CO_COMP_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 25	Component
		Low legal hurdles for entry	CO_OPEN1_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 26	Adminhurd (-8-0): Degree of administrative hurdles to become an electoral competitor (reversed). Mean of reg_parr_part and reg_parr_cand Source(s): ACE, Bischoff (2006), Bowler et al. (2003), CoE, Elklit/Reynolds (2002), Hug (2001), IPU, Katz (1996), Mozaffar/Schedler (2002), Tavits (2006) Eff_thresh (62.5-99.77): Effective threshold calculated as approximately the midway between the threshold of representation (the lowest level of support with which a party could win a seat under the most favourable conditions) and the threshold of exclusion (the highest level of support with which a party could fail to win a seat under the most unfavourable conditions). Calculated according to Lijphart's formula: $T_{eff} = 75\% / (M+1)$. We consider only theoretical information and NOT results from elections. The indicator was reversed by subtracting the effective threshold from 100 (lower effective thresholds receive higher values). If the legal threshold in proportional systems and mixed compensatory systems, respectively, exceeds the effective threshold, the legal threshold becomes the effective threshold. Source(s): District magnitude: see meandistrict above
		Effective Contestation	CO_OPEN2_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 25	Smallpavo (-48.9-0): Chance for small parties to win a seat: vote share of smallest party in the lower house of national parliament (reversed = multiplied with -1). The higher the value, the smaller the smallest party, hence the greater the possibility for small parties to win a seat. Independent candidates and

						<p>“other” parties are included into the calculation of Smallpavo. Source(s): WZB, Nohlen et al. (2001).</p> <p>Enep (1.12-16.57): Effective number of parties at the electoral level.</p>
		Effective Access to Resources	CO_OPEN3_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 26	<p>Ceilings (0-2): Ceilings on expenditure and income of political parties. Sum of two variables: 0 = there are no ceilings on expenditure or income of political parties; +1 if there are either ceilings on expenditure or income of political parties; +2 if there are ceilings on both, expenditure and income of political parties Sources: IDEA, Griner/Zovatto (2005), Castillo/Zovatto 1998; Gutierrez/Zovatto (2011); GRECO (2011); Cons; Partylaw.</p> <p>Funding (0-2): Provisions for direct and indirect public funding of political parties. Sum of two variables: 0 = there are no provisions for direct or indirect funding; +1 if there are either provisions for direct or indirect public funding; +2 if there are provisions for both, direct and indirect party funding. IDEA, Griner/Zovatto (2005), Castillo/Zovatto 1998; Gutierrez/Zovatto (2011); GRECO (2011); Cons; Partylaw.</p>
		Contestability (openness of elections)	CO_OPEN_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 25	Component
		Competition	COMPET_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 25	Function
		Balance of checks between executive and legislative powers	MC_CHECKS1_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 25	<p>Balexleg (12.50-95.83): Balance of checks between the executive and the legislative powers as represented by the (reversed) absolute difference (controlex — controle) in the standardized checks available to the legislative (controlex) and the executive (controle) powers over each other. The measure is reversed by subtracting the absolute difference from 100. Therefore, low values indicate unbalanced checks either in favour of the executive or the legislative, whereas high values are assigned when there is a balance in checks between the legislative and the executive branches. Source(s): see controlex, controle (codebook)</p>
		Balance between executive and legislative powers	MC_CHECKS2_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 24	<p>Balpowexle (0-1): Balance of powers (opposition vs. government) as calculated by: $C = 1 - \frac{\text{abs}((G-O)/100)}$, where $G = \sum g_i / \sum g_i$ and $O = \sum o_i / \sum o_i$. G_i and o_i stand for the seat shares of government and opposition parties respectively. C equals 0 whenever the government (or the opposition) controls the whole legislature and 1 if there is a full balance between government and opposition Source(s): WZB</p>

						<p>Seatsgov (0.717*10⁻⁷-1): Proportion of parliamentary seats belonging to governing parties as calculated by the inverse logit: $1/(1+2.71-((G-50)/3))$, $G = \sum gi^2 / \sum gi$. G_i stands for the seat shares of government parties. The indicator takes low values for minority governments and high values for majority governments.</p> <p>Source(s): WZB</p>
		Judicial review	MC_CHECKS3_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 24	<p>Judrev (-1-2): This variable documents the existence of constitutional provisions allowing for judicial or constitutional review of legislative and executive decisions.</p> <p>Source(s): DAP, Constitute, CCP.</p> <p>Powjudi (0-2): Power of judiciary. Effective possibility to control political decisions. Their coding on the basis of Kritzer (2002).</p> <p>Categories: 0 = Low power (parliament is the legitimate source of all laws); 1 = Moderate power (constitutional review but not with respect to all laws or not widely used); 2 = High power (court has the final say over all laws)</p> <p>Source(s): Kneipp 2007, Kritzer (2002), La Porta et al. (2003), Rhyne (1978), Ten Brinke/Deml (2002), DAP, constitutions.</p>
		Checks between three powers	MC_CHECKS_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 23	Component
		Degree of Federalism	MC_VERT1_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	36 (GEO, LIE and SRB missing); 36; 36; 26	<p>Federalism (0-2): Federalism as defined by Gerring and Thacker (2004) (indicator was reversed).</p> <p>Categories: 0 = non-federal; 1 = semi-federal [where there are elective legislatures at the regional level but in which constitutional sovereignty is still reserved to the national government]; and 2 = federal [elective regional legislatures plus constitutional recognition of subnational authority].</p> <p>Source(s): Gerring/Thacker 2004, CCP.</p> <p>Bicameralism (0-2): Bicameralism as defined by Gerring and Thacker (2004) (indicator was reversed).</p> <p>Categories: 0 = unicameral [no or weak upper house]; 1 = weak bicameral [upper house has some effective veto power, though not necessarily a formal veto]; and 2 = strong bicameral [same as above but the two houses are also incongruent]</p> <p>Source(s): Gerring/Thacker 2004.</p>
		Subnational fiscal autonomy	MC_VERT2_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 25	<p>Subexp (1.22-98.7): Subnational expenditures as a percentage of the total national expenditures.</p> <p>Source(s): their calculations based on data of GFS, WB, OECD, Dexia</p>

						Subrev (0.26-57): Subnational revenues as a percentage of the total national revenues. Source(s): their calculations based on data of GFS, WB, OECD
		Vertical checks of power	MC_VERT_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	36 (GEO, LIE and SRB missing); 36; 36; 25	Component
		Mutual constraints of constitutional powers	MUTUCONS_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	36 (GEO, LIE and SRB missing); 36; 36; 23	Function
		Time horizon for action	GC_GORE1_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 25	Leglen (0-3): Length of governmental (legislative or presidential) period (if no given rule in constitution the maximum length is taken). Source(s): CON, IPU, Wikipedia, CCP. Govterm (0-3): Is there a term limit of government? A term limit exists, when it is not possible to re-elect an incumbent after a certain period of time. Categories: 0 = 0 to 4 years; 1 = 5 to 8 years; 2 = 9-12 years; 3 = more than 12 years. Source(s): CIA.
		Public support	GC_GORE2_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 26	Confgov (9.89-56.54): Confidence in the government: Share of survey respondents indicating high confidence/trust. Source(s): their calculation based on CSES, ESS, LB, WVS, EB, ISS. Devbehav (56.35-98.71): Deviant behaviour. Share of survey who answer – on a scale from 1 (never justifiable) to 10 (always justifiable) – 8, 9 or 10 regarding each of the following activities: a) avoiding a fare on public transport, b) cheating on taxes, c) someone accepting a bribe and d) claiming government benefits. Source(s): their calculation based on WVS, EVS, BCNTS, ESS; LB, ISS, EB.
		Governmental stability	GC_GORE3_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 25	Govstab (16.70-1000): Stability of government. A cabinet is seen as stable if its party composition does not change during a whole legislative period. Relatively short governments, i.e. interim governments (< 1/6 of the legislation), are excluded. A government gets 100% (for all years within a legislative period) if it does not change in the respective legislative period. If there is a change, Govstab reflects the number of days that the government was stable as a share of the remaining possible period. Source(s): their calculation according to procedure by Lijphart (1984), data from WZB and IPU (for India).

						Cabchange (-3-0): Number of major cabinet changes. Source(s): BCNTS.
		Government resources	GC_GORE_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 25	
		No Anti-government action	GC_CEIM1_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 26	Antigovact (-51-0): Legitimate anti-government action (reversed). Sum of two indicators: Agdemons and Genstrike Source(s): BCNTS. Violantigov (-10-0): - Definition: Illegitimate anti-government action (reversed). Sum of two indicators: Guerill and Revolut. Source(s): BCNTS.
		No Interference	GC_CEIM2_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	36 (GEO, LIE and MKD missing); 36; 34; 24	Mip (0-6): No political interference by the military: Source(s): ICRG. Rip (1-6): No political interference by religion. Religious tensions may stem from the domination of society and/or governance by a single religious group that seeks to replace civil law by religious law and to exclude other religions from the political and/or social process; the desire of a single religious group to dominate governance; the suppression off religious freedom; the desire of a religious group to express its own identity, separate from the country as a whole. The risk involved in these situations range from inexperienced people imposing inappropriate policies through civil dissent to civil war; values from 0 (high risk) to 6 (no risk of political interference by religion). Source(s): ICRG. Publser (0.43-7.12): The public service is independent from political interference. Measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 10. Source(s): IMD; ICRG; WGI.
		Administrative assertiveness	GC_CEIM3_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	36 (GEO, LIE and MKD missing); 36; 34; 25	Govdec (0.9-8.05): Assessment of the effective implementation of government decisions. Measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 10. Source(s): IMD; ICRG; WGI. Bureau (0-4): Bureaucracy quality. High points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services. In these low risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training. Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative functions. Source(s): ICRG.

		Independence of Central Bank	GC_CEIM4_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 24	CenBank_Ind (-0.89—0.10): Assessment of the independence of the central bank. The indicator was reversed by multiplying all values with -1. High values (close to zero) represent lower independence. Source(s): Crowe/Meade 2008; Cukierman et al. 1992; Cukierman et al. 2003; Jácome & Vázquez (2005), Dincer/Eichengreen 2013.
		Conditions for efficient implementation	GC_CEIM_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	36 (GEO, LIE and MKD missing); 36; 34; 23	Component
		Government capability	GOVCAP_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	36 (GEO, LIE and MKD missing); 36; 34; 23	Function
		Control	CONTROL_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	35; 35; 34; 23	Principle
Quality of democracy_Equality Source: Democracy Barometer						
		Disclosure of party financing	TR_NOSEC1_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 26	Discinco (0-1): Disclosure rules for contributions to political parties (parties have to disclose contributions received). 0 = no provision for disclosure of income; 1 = rules on disclosure of income. Sources: IDEA, Griner/Zovatto (2005), Castillo/Zovatto 1998; Gutierrez/Zovatto (2011); GRECO (2011); Cons; Partylaw. Discexp (0-1): Disclosure rules for expenditures of political parties (parties have to disclose contributions received). 0 = no provision for disclosure of income; 1 = rules on disclosure of income. Source(s): IDEA, Griner/Zovatto (2005), Castillo/Zovatto 1998; Gutierrez/Zovatto (2011); GRECO (2011); Cons; Partylaw.
		Absence of corruption	TR_NOSEC2_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	36 (GEO, LIE and MKD missing); 36; 35; 23	Corrup (0-6): Assessment of corruption within the political system. Such corruption is a threat to foreign investment for several reasons: it distorts the economic and financial environment; it reduces the efficiency of government and business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability; and, last but not least, introduces an inherent instability into the political process. Values range from 0 (high risk of corruption) to 6 (no risk of corruption between politics and business). Source(s): ICRG.

						CPI (1.3-10): The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) measures the overall extent of corruption (frequency and/or size of bribes) in the public and political sectors. Assessments are based on surveys of business people and assessments by country analysts. Sources can vary from year to year. Values range from 0 to 10 (the higher the values, the less corruption). Source(s): TI.
		No secrecy	TR_NOSEC_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	36 (GEO, LIE and MKD missing); 36; 35; 23	Component
		Freedom of information	TR_PTPP1_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 26	<p>RestricFOI (0-3): Restriction of freedom of information / barriers for access to official information. Categories: 0 = No Freedom of Information (FOI) legislation; 1 = High restrictions (high fees for in- formation AND long delays [more than 2 weeks]); 2 = Considerable restrictions (1 restriction only (fee, delay)); 3 = No restrictions (no fee, immediate information [less than 2 weeks]). Source(s): their composition based on Banisar (2006), CON, CDA, Tromp (2008), HRR, FI.</p> <p>EffFOI (0-4): Effectiveness of Freedom of Information (FOI) laws. FOI is seen as effective if the following conditions are fulfilled: A) FOI does not only cover the executive and administration (0.5) but also further public authorities (1); B) Official documents are accessible (except for common exemptions such as matters of national security or documents that contain personal information, etc.) (1) but not considerable number of exemptions and/or delay for Cabinet documents (0.5); C) Compliance with FOI is supervised by an independent commission (1) or at least a court review (i.e. directly contact the court (1) but not first administrative review (0.5)). Foi_eff = sum of A+B+C; recoded such as 1.5 = 1; 2 = 2; 2.5 = 3; 3 = 4. A country without any FOI legislation receives the value 0. Categories: 0 = No FOI law; 1 = Low effectiveness; 2 = Quite considerable effectiveness; 3 = Considerable effectiveness; 4 = High effectiveness. Source(s): their composition based on Banisar (2006), CON, CDA, Tromp (2008), HRR, FI.</p>
		Informational openness	TR_PTPP2_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 26	Legmedia (0-30): Press Freedom: Legal Environment (reversed). “The legal environment category encompasses an examination of both the laws and regulations that could influence media content and the government’s inclination to use these laws and legal institutions to restrict the media’s ability to operate: We assess the positive impact of legal and constitutional guarantees for freedom of expression; the potentially negative aspects of security legislation, the penal code, and other criminal statutes; penalties for libel and defamation; the existence of and ability to use freedom of information legislation; the independence of the judiciary and of official media regulatory bodies;

						<p>registration requirements for both media outlets and journalists; and the ability of journalists' groups to operate freely." Countries are given a total score from 0 (best) to 30 (worst). Source(s): FH.</p> <p>Polmedia (2-40): Press Freedom: Political Environment (reversed). "Under the political environment category, we evaluate the degree of political control over the content of news media. Issues examined include the editorial independence of both state-owned and privately owned media; access to information and sources; official censorship and self-censorship; the vibrancy of the media; the ability of both foreign and local reporters to cover the news freely and without harassment; and the intimidation of journalists by the state or other actors, including arbitrary detention and imprisonment, violent assaults, and other threats." Countries are given a total score from 0 (best) to 40 (worst). Source(s): FH.</p>
		Willingness for transparent communication	TR_PTPP3_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 24	<p>Transp (0-8.29): Assessment of the transparency of government policy. Measured on a scale ranging from "The government does not often communicate its intentions successfully" (1) to "The government is transparent towards citizens" (6). This is recoded into a scale ranging from 0 to 10. Source(s): IMD; FH.</p>
		Provisions for transparent political process	TR_PTPP_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 24	Component
		Transparency	TRANSPAR_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	36 (GEO, LIE and MKD missing); 34; 35; 23	Function
		Suffrage	PAR_EQPA1_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 24	<p>Suffrage (6-13): Requirements for and disqualifications of active suffrage. 17-sum of requirements and disqualifications. Source(s): IPU-Chronicles.</p> <p>Regprovap (13.53-100): Registered voters as a percentage of voting age population, in parliamentary elections. Source(s): IDEA-T, Nohlen (1995)</p>
		Non-selectivity of electoral participation	PAR_EQPA2_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 26	<p>Repturned (-11.60—0.08): Representative voter turnout in legislative elections in terms of resources (education and income). Calculated as follows: (1) Calculation of gaps in terms of education and in terms of income (3 groups each): education gap = mean of share of respondents with high/middle/low education in survey – share of voting respondents with high/middle/low education (differences in absolute values); income gap = mean of share of respondents with high/middle/low income – share of voting respondents with</p>

						<p>high/middle/low income (differences in absolute values). (2) Calculation of degree of unrepresentative turnout: sum of education gap + income gap. (3) The scale was reversed by multiplying its values by -1. Source(s): their calculation based on AfB, AsB, AsnB, CSES, ESS, LB, WVS, ISS, EES, EB.</p> <p>Repturngeag (-11.44—0.26): Representative voter turnout in legislative elections in terms of gender and age. Calculated as follows: (1) Calculation of gaps in terms of gender and in terms of age (3 groups: 15-30; 31-65; 65+): gender gap = mean of share of women in survey – share of female voting respondents and share of men in survey – share of male voting respondents (differences in absolute values); age gap = mean of share of respondents 18-30/31-65/65+ years old – respective share of 18-30/31-65/65+ year old voting respondents (differences in absolute values). (2) Calculation of degree of unrepresentative turnout: sum of gender gap + age gap. (3) The scale was reversed by multiplying its values by -1. Source(s): their calculation based on AfB, AsB, AsnB, CSES, ESS, LB, WVS, ISS, EES, EB.</p>
		Non-selectivity of alternative participation	PAR_EQPA3_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 26	<p>Repaltined (-63.31—4.8): Representative participation in alternative forms of participation (signing petitions, attending lawful demonstrations) in terms of resources (education and income). Calculated as follows: (1) Calculation of gaps in terms of education and in terms of income (3 groups each): education gap = mean of share of respondents with high/middle/low education in survey – share of participating respondents (signing petitions / attending demonstrations) with high/middle/low education (differences in absolute values); income gap = mean of share of respondents with high/middle/low income – share of participating respondents (signing petitions / attending demonstrations) with high/middle/low income (differences in absolute values). (2) Calculation of degree of unrepresentative participation: sum of education gap + income gap for both participation forms (signing petitions / attending demonstrations). (3) Overall mean of both indicators (signing petition / attending demonstrations) for unrepresentative participation. (4) The scale was reversed by multiplying its values by -1. Source(s): their calculation based on AfB, AsB, AsnB, CSES, ESS, LB, WVS, ISS, EES, EB.</p> <p>Repaltgeag (-63.31—4.8): Representative participation in alternative forms of participation (signing petitions, attending lawful demonstrations) in terms of gender and age. Calculated as follows: (1) Calculation of gaps in terms of gender and in terms of age (3 groups: 15-30; 31-65; 65+): gender gap = mean of share of women in survey – share of female participating respondents (signing petitions / attending demonstrations) and share of men in survey – share of male participating respondents (signing petitions / attending demonstrations) (differences in absolute values); age gap = mean of share of respondents 18-30/31-65/65+ years old – respective share of 18-30/31-65/65+ year old participating respondents (signing petitions / attending demonstrations)</p>

						(differences in absolute values). (2) Calculation of degree of unrepresentative turnout: sum of gender gap + age gap. (3) Overall mean of both indicators (signing petition / attending demonstrations) for unrepresentative participation. (4) The scale was re-versed by multiplying its values by -1. Source(s): their calculation based on AfB, AsB, AsnB, CSES, ESS, LB, WVS, ISS, EES, EB.
		Equality of participation	PAR_EQPA_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 24	Component
		Rules facilitating participation	PAR_EFPA1_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 26	Facilitat (0-1): Facilitation of electoral participation. Categories: 0 = voters can vote at specific polling station only; 1 = voters can vote everywhere in the same district; 2 = voters can vote everywhere in the country; Additional point (+1) if absentee ballot is possible; Additional point (+1) if there are mobile polling stations; Additional point (+1) if there is a possibility to vote in advance. Source(s): ACE, IDEA-T, Blais et al (2007), EV. Regis (0-1): Voter registration is not compulsory (1 = not compulsory, 0 = is compulsory) Source(s): ACE, CON, Rosenberg/Chen (2009). OSCE, CCP.
		Effective institutionalized participation	PAR_EFPA2_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 25	Meanpart (18.44-98.92): Participation rate in % of registered electorate in elections of respective or previous years (only first ballot considered if more were held): average of legislative elections (copied to years of following legislation), and presidential elections if they exist (copied to years of following legislation). Source(s): AED, ANU, IDEA-T, IPU, UCI, USEP. Eff_DD (0-1.26): Effective use of direct democratic instruments. Sum of national non-mandatory referenda per year. Source(s): c2d
		Effective non-institutionalized participation	PAR_EFPA3_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 26	Petition (1.21-90.58): Practice of non-institutionalized participation: share of survey respondents who indicate having signed petitions. Source(s): their calculation based on AfB, AsB, AsnB, CSES, ESS, LB, WVS, ISS, EES, EB. Demons (0.09-32.71): Practice of non-institutionalized participation: share of survey respondents who indicate having attended lawful demonstrations. Source(s): their calculation based on AfB, AsB, AsnB, CSES, ESS, LB, WVS, ISS, EES, EB.

		Effective participation	PAR_EFPA_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 25	Component
		Participation	PARTICIP_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 24	Function
		Structural possibilities for inclusion of preferences	REP_SR1_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 25	<p>Seatperin (0.05-24.73): Number of seats (lower house) per 100'000 inhabitants. Source(s): ACEA, DPI, IPU, UNSTATS.</p> <p>No_district (0-2.82): Number of districts in lowest tier. The logarithm of the number of districts is taken to account for the fact that more districts are less important in countries which already have a lot of districts (diminishing marginal returns of additional district). Source(s): IPU, Golder (2004), PdoA, Electoral statistics</p>
		Constitutional provisions for direct democracy	REP_SR2_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 25	<p>Dirdem (0-4): Constitutional provisions for direct democracy. Sum of four direct democratic institutions (1 point for each institution). 1) Mandatory referendum; 2) veto-player referendum: referendum is triggered and question is asked by an existing veto-player; 3) popular veto: non veto-player (part of parliament, citizens...) triggers referendum, but question is asked by an existing veto player; 4) popular initiative: non veto-player asks question and triggers referendum. Source(s): Hug/Tsebelis (2001); ACE, C2d; Cons; Electoral laws; Direct Democracy Navigator; Welp/Serdült 2009.</p> <p>DD_Quora (0.4-1): Constitutional provisions for approval or participation quorum in direct democratic votes. If different rules apply for different instruments, the rule which applies for most instruments is taken. Source(s): Their calculations based on: Kaufmann, ACM, Venice Commission, C2D, Herrera/Mattozzi, Auer/Bützer, Rodrigo Salazar.</p>
		No distortion	REP_SR3_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 25	<p>Gallagindex (-45.82—0.18): Index of disproportionality between vote and seat distributions according to the Gallagher "Least Squares Index" for all parties in general election (reversed). Where v_i is the percentage of votes obtained by ith party and s_i is the percentage of seats obtained by ith party. Source(s): WZB.</p> <p>Issuecongr (23.98-97.32): Congruence between distribution of left/right positions among voters and distribution of left/right positions among members of parliament (measured by party positions). Calculated as follows: (1) Each party was assigned to one of three categories (left/middle/right), which were calculated on the basis of the mean and standard deviation of the distribution of left/right positions of all parties for a given election (e.g. left range: left of 1 standard deviation). The distribution of the three categories within parliaments</p>

						<p>was then calculated by taking into account the seat shares of the different parties. (2) Voters, i.e. survey respondents, were assigned to one of three categories (left/middle/right) according to their self-placement on a left-right scale. The three categories were determined by subdividing the left-right scale (either ranging from 1-10 or 0-10) on the grounds of mean and standard deviation. The distribution of voters across the three categories was then calculated and the values averaged across 5 years (1990-1995; 1996-2000, 2001-2005 etc.) (3) For each of the categories, the differences between the seat shares in parliament and among voters were calculated. These issue differences for each category are then added and divided by 2. This gives a scale (theoretically) ranging from 0-100, where 0 = complete congruence and 100 = complete incongruence between voters and parliament. (4) The scale was reversed by subtracting values from 100.</p> <p>Source(s): their calculation based on Altman et al. (2009), CMP, Coppedge (1997), CSES, EB, EES, ESS, ISS, IPU, LAPOP, LB, PELA, PdoA, Wiesehomeier/Benoit (2009), Wikipedia, WVS, WZB</p>
		Substantive representation	REP_SR_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 25	Component
		No legal constraints for inclusion of minorities	REP_DR1_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 25	<p>Polrightwom (0-3): This variable measures the political rights of women, including the right to vote, the right to run for political office, the right to hold elected and appointed government positions, the right to join political parties and the right to petition government officials. Coding is based on US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.</p> <p>Categories: 0 = None of women's political rights are guaranteed by law. There are laws that completely restrict the participation of women in the political process; 1 = Political equality is guaranteed by law. However, there are significant limitations in practice. Women hold less than five percent of seats in the national legislature and in other high-ranking government positions; 2 = Political equality is guaranteed by law. Women hold more than five percent but less than thirty percent of seats in the national legislature and/or in other high-ranking government positions; 3 = Political equality is guaranteed by law and in practice. Women hold more than thirty percent of seats in the national legislature and/or in other high-ranking government positions.</p> <p>Source(s): CIRI.</p> <p>Constraints (0-7): Measures the existence of constraints regarding passive suffrage and inverses the score: 8-Sum of 5 different indicators: Age, Citizenship, Citizenship by birth, Offices and Others.</p> <p>Source(s): IPU-Chronicles.</p> <p>Partban (0-1): Ban of ethnic minority parties. Categories: 0 = there is a ban of ethnic minority parties; 1 = no parties are banned. If regional parties are banned</p>

						the variable is coded as 0. Source(s): IAEP
		Adequate representation of women	REP_DR2_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 36; 24	Womrep (1-47.3): Proportion of female representatives in the lower house of parliament in % of all seats. Source(s): Armingeon et al. (2010), Vanhanen (2008), IPU, WB Womgov (0-60): Proportion of female representatives in the government (incl. ministerial positions) Source(s): HDR, UNECE.
		Effective access to power for minorities	REP_DR3_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 35; 24	Minrep (0-4): Index of descriptive representation of autochthonous ethnic minority groups in the lower chamber of parliament. Ethnic minority groups are selected on the basis of politically relevant ethnic groups according to EPR-ETH (groups > 1%). Descriptive representation is defined as the representation of minority groups through members of their own ethnic groups. Proportionality of descriptive representation is measured as a reversed Gallagher index: where refers to a group's share in the population and to the share of descriptive representatives in parliament. The index is restricted at 1 in order not to correct for overrepresentation. Source(s): HRR, Hänni (2015), MAR. Minpower (1-4.33): Access to central power by ethnic minority groups (mean of all countries). Categories: 1 = discriminated; 2 = powerless; 3 = regional or separatist autonomy; 4 = junior partner; 5 = senior partner. Source: Cederman et al. (2013)
		Descriptive representation	REP_DR_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 35; 24	Component
		Representation	REPRES_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	37 (GEO and LIE missing); 37; 35; 24	Function
		Equality	EQUALITY_year	2014; 2010; 2000; 1990	36 (GEO, LIE and SRB missing); 36; 34; 23	Principle
Quality of democracy_quality of democracy Source: Democracy Barometer						

Concept tree: overall quality of democracy, composed of 3 principles that are freedom, control and equality, each of them respectively composed of 3 functions						
	Quality of democracy	DQ_year	1990; 2000; 2010; 2014	34; 35; 33; 23	Overall index	
Local government Source : V-Dem 6 (Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, with David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Kelly McMann, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Jeffrey Staton, Brigitte Zimmerman, Rachel Sigman, Frida Andersson, Valeriya Mechkova, and Farhad Miri. 2016. “V-Dem Codebook v6.” Varieties of Democracy (Vdem) Project.)						
	Local government elected	v2ellocelc_year	1990; 2000; 2010; 2014	27; 26; 36; 24	Interval 0-5	<p>0: Generally, offices at the local level are not elected. 1: Generally, the local executive is elected but not the assembly. 2: Generally, the local assembly is elected but not the executive. 3: Generally, the local executive is elected and there is no assembly. 4: Generally, the local assembly is elected and there is no executive. 5: Generally, the local executive and assembly are elected.</p> <p>Government offices” here refers to a local executive and a local assembly, <i>not</i> a judiciary and <i>not</i> minor bureaucrats. An <i>executive</i> is a single individual (or a very small group) (e.g., a mayor). An <i>assembly</i> is a larger body of officials. “Elected” refers to offices that are directly elected by citizens or indirectly elected by a local elected assembly. All other methods of obtaining office – including appointment by a higher level of government – are considered to be <i>non-elected</i>. In classifying a position as elected one is making no judgments about the freeness/fairness of the election or the relative extent of suffrage. One is simply indicating that there is an election and that the winner of that election (however conducted) generally takes office.</p> <p>Important notice: there is little variation within data</p>
	Relative power of local government	v2ellocpwr_year	1990; 2000; 2010; 2014	31; 36; 36; 21	ordinal 0-4 per year	<p>The concern lies with the relative power of local offices to each other, not the power of local offices (only major offices, such as the executive, assembly, and judiciary) <i>not</i> those of minor bureaucrats. (A body of government officials, such as an assembly or judiciary, counts as one office.)</p> <p>An office is “subordinate” if its officeholders can be chosen and removed by another office or if its decisions can be blocked or modified by another office, but it cannot</p> <p>0: All or nearly all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the local level.</p>

						<p>1: Some elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the local level. 2: Elected and non-elected offices are approximately equal in power at the local level. 3: Most non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the local level. 4: All or nearly all non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the local level.</p> <p>Important notice: there is little variation within data</p>
		Local government index (v2xel_locelec)	v2xel_locelec_year	1990; 2000; 2010; 2014	30; 36; 36; 22	<p>Aggregation per year: First, local government elected (v2ellocelec) is recoded so that 0=none elected, 1=only executive elected, 2=only assembly elected, and 3=both elected. This new construct is then scaled to vary from 0-1 and multiplied by local offices relative power (v2ellocpwr) scaled to vary from 0-1.</p> <p>Are there elected local governments, and – if so – to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level?</p> <p>The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected local governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected local governments but where those governments are subordinate to unelected officials at the local level (perhaps appointed by a higher-level body). A high score would be accorded to a country in which local governments are elected and able to operate without restrictions from unelected actors at the local level (with the exception of judicial bodies). (Naturally, local governments remain subordinate to the regional and national governments.)</p>
<p>Other variables</p> <p>Sources diverse: Eurobarometer (2006), Gallup World Poll (2012) In OECD (2013) “Trust in government, policy effectiveness and the governance agenda”, in Government at a Glance 2013, OECD Publishing; Van der Kold (2009) Local electoral participation in Europe: Is it really declining? <i>University of Twente (unpublished)</i>; World Happiness index</p>						
		Trust in local government	Trustlg_2006	2006	24	<p>QA18.4 I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust the council of your city\ village</p> <p>Source: Eurobarometer 2006 (in European Commission, European Social Reality, Report on the Special Eurobarometer 273 / Wave 66.3 – TNS Opinion & Social.</p> <p>Important notice: there is little variation within data</p>
		Trust in local police	Trustlocpol_2012	2012	25	<p>in %, per year</p> <p>Data for the Local police refer to the percentage of “yes” answers to question: “In the city or area where you live, do you have confidence in the local police</p>

						force, or not?" Source: Gallup World Poll (2012)
		Trust in local and regional authorities	Trust_locandregauth_2008	2008	27	Trust in local and regional authorities Source: Loughlin, Heindricks and Lidström (2011), based upon the Special Eurobarometer no. 307, Autumn 2008
		Trust in local and regional government	Trust_lgrg_2013	2013	28	Trust in local and regional governments Source: Eurobarometer 79.3, QA12, http://www.gesis.org/eurobarometer-data-service/data-access/
		Local turnout (elections)	locturnout_period	1988-1993, 1998-2002, 2006-2009	19; 23; 21	in %, average of time period Data for the Local turnout refer to the number of voters in percentage of the number of eligible voters in a local election during the stated time period (if there has been more than one election in the stated time period, a country mean is calculated). Definitions: “Actual voters” = Everyone making the effort to show up at the polling. “Total number of eligible voters” = Assumption: Being on the voting register <i>is</i> compulsory and often more or less automatic for citizens. Two factors, however, may can influence the turnout figures in the dataset: Firstly, various countries seem to differ in the extent to which the requirement to be on the voting list is enforced. Secondly, in <i>local</i> elections in the EU countries, also non-citizens meeting some requirements are allowed to vote. “Local elections” = All local elections held on the same day. In some cases using ‘two round systems’ for council elections (as in France and Luxembourg, for example) the turnout rate in the first round has been taken. Source: Van der Kolk (2009)
		Happiness	Happiness_2013-2015	2013-2015 (average)	38	Happiness score 0-10 The data comes from the Gallup World Poll. The happiness score represents the average from 2013 to 2015. It is the national average response to the question of life evaluations (Cantril life ladder as measurement indicator). The English wording of the question is “Please imagine a ladder, with steps numbered from 0 at the bottom to 10 at the top. The top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time?” Source: World Happiness Report 2016.

Local efficiency						
Local financials						
Source: OECD fiscal decentralisation database; Eurostat						
		Consolidated local government expenditure as percentage of total general government expenditure	OECD_LG_D%tot_year	1990; 1995; 2000; 2005; 2010; 2014	2; 22; 23; 24; 24; 24	The consolidated expenditure of each level of government is defined as <u>total spending minus the inter-governmental transfer spending of that government level</u> . Consolidated total general government expenditure is defined as global total expenditure at general government level plus the total inter-governmental property expenditure. The addition is made because the latter represents payments by one level of government for a service provided by another government level and it essentially avoids consolidation of property expenditure at general government level. Source: OECD fiscal decentralization database [Table 5: 1970 – 2014, <u>local level only</u>].
		Consolidated local government revenue as percentage of total general government revenue	OECD_LG_R%tot_year	1990; 1995; 2000; 2005; 2010; 2014	2; 22; 23; 24; 24; 24	The consolidated revenue of each level of government is defined as <u>total revenue minus the intergovernmental transfer revenue of that government level</u> . Consolidated total general government revenue is defined as global total revenue at general government level plus the total inter-governmental property income. The addition is made because the latter represents payments by one level of government for a service provided by another government level and it essentially avoids consolidation of property income at general government level. Source: OECD fiscal decentralization database [Table 7: 1970 – 2014, <u>local level only</u>].
		Inter-governmental transfer revenue earned at the local level as percentage of total government revenue (both internally consolidated between the Central and Social Security sectors only)	OECD_LG_Rtrans%tot_year	1990; 1995; 2000; 2005; 2010; 2014	2; 22; 23; 24; 24; 24	Intergovernmental transfer revenue has been defined as <u>transfers payable to each level of government by other levels of government</u> . The figures do not take account of either transfers from the supranational level of government or transfers between the central government level and social security which are considered to be internal. Total general government revenue is defined as the sum of central, including social security revenue, state/regional revenue and local revenue. No consolidation has been applied (apart from the internal consolidation between central and social security) because the transfers data are non-consolidated by definition. Source: OECD fiscal decentralization database [Table 13: 1970 – 2014, <u>local level only</u>].
		Local government's tax revenue as percentage of total general government tax revenue	OECD_LG_TaxAut1%tot_year	1990; 1995; 2000; 2005; 2010; 2014	19; 25; 25; 25; 25; 23	The tax revenue data is obtained from the OECD Revenue Statistics database. Source: OECD fiscal decentralization database [Table 9: 1965 – 2014, <u>local level only</u>].

		Local government own tax revenue as a percentage of subnational government tax revenue	OECD_LG_TaxAut2_year	1995; 2002; 2005; 2011	17; 25; 25; 25	Part of Local Government's own Tax in % of Subnational Government Tax Income Source: own calculation for the local level only based on the OECD fiscal decentralization database (AV)
		Local government own tax revenue as a percentage of general government tax revenue	OECD_LG_TaxAut3_year	1995; 2002; 2005; 2011	17; 25; 25; 25	Part of Local Government's own Tax Income in % of General Government Tax Income Source: own calculation for the local level only based on the OECD fiscal decentralization database (AV)
		Local government non earmarked grants revenue	OECD_NonEar0_year	2000; 2005; 2010	19; 20; 12	Unconditional grants revenue of local governments as a % of total grants revenue of local governments [Table 2: 2000 – 2010, for local government only]
		Local government non earmarked grants revenue as a percentage of subnational government grants revenue	OECD_NonEar1_year	2000; 2005; 2010	19; 20; 12	Unconditional grants revenue of local governments as a % of Transfers of Subnational Government Source: own calculation for the local level only based on the OECD fiscal decentralization database (AV)
		Local government non earmarked grants revenue as a percentage of GDP	OECD_NonEar2_year	2000; 2005; 2010	19; 20; 12	Unconditional Transfers of local governments as % of GDP Source: own calculation for the local level only based on the OECD fiscal decentralization database (AV)
		Expenditure of general government: Total for subsector local government	gov_10a_main_exp_year	2000,2010,2014	30; 31; 31	in % of GDP per year the total government expenditure of an accounting period comprises the following transactions, based on Government Finance Statistics (GFS) of ESA 2010 : Intermediate consumption (see below) + compensation of employees (see below) + interest + social benefits other than social transfers in kind + social transfers in kind via market producers + subsidies + other current expenditure + capital expenditure = total expenditure Source: Eurostat See also p. 431-433 of ESA 2010 manual. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-manuals-and-guidelines/-/KS-02-13-269

		Expenditure of general government: Total intermediate consumption for subsector local government	gov_10a_main_icon_year	2000,2010,2014	30; 31; 31	<p>in % of GDP per year</p> <p>Intermediate consumption of general government comprises goods and services consumed during the accounting period in the production process. Goods and services may be acquired by market and nonmarket establishments of government as well.</p> <p>Source: Eurostat</p> <p>See p. 431 of ESA 2010 manual</p> <p>http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-manuals-and-guidelines/-/KS-02-13-269</p>
		Expenditure of general government: Total compensation of employees for subsector local government	gov_10a_main_comp_year	2000,2010,2014	30; 31; 31	<p>in % of GDP per year :</p> <p>Compensation of employees includes wages and salaries paid as well as employers' social contributions including imputed social contributions, that are viewed in the European system of national and regional accounts (ESA) as uses of households and as resources of government, and thus not to be consolidated. Compensation is recorded on an accrual basis, at the time the work is done, and not at the time the wage is due for payment or paid. Wages include bonus and other lump sums (due to arrears or contract renewal) paid, and the relevant time of recording can be difficult to determine: when covering long periods of employment, it is often the time of determination of the bonus rather than the time period that the bonus is nominally intended to cover.</p> <p>Source: Eurostat</p> <p>See p. 431 of ESA 2010 manual</p> <p>http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-manuals-and-guidelines/-/KS-02-13-269</p>
		Revenue of general government : Total of subsector local government	gov_10a_main_rev_year	2000,2010,2014	30; 31; 31	<p>in % of GDP per year</p> <p>The total revenue of general government comprises of the following components:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> total taxes (on production, income and wealth, capital) + total social contributions (i.e. grants from international Organisations) + total sales of goods and services + other current revenue + other capital revenue = total revenue <p>Source: Eurostat</p>

						See also p. 428 of ESA 2010 manual. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-manuals-and-guidelines/-/KS-02-13-269
		Net lending (+), net borrowing (-) for the subsector of local government	gov_10a_main_net_year	2000; 2010; 2014	30; 31; 31	change in % of GDP per year The government net lending (+)/net borrowing (-) is the difference between total revenue and total expenditure of general government. It is equal to the balancing item of the capital account in the ESA accounts. It represents the amount the government has available to lend or must borrow to finance its non-financial operations. Source: Eurostat
	Others Sources: diverse					
		GDP derived from PPP	NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD_year	1990; 2000; 2010; 2014	30, 38; 38, 37	GDP derived from PPP Source: Worldbank
		Corruption	CorrPer_2014	2014	36	Score 0-100 The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. A country or territory's score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). Note that N/A means a country was not included in the index during the particular year. Source: http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results#myAnchor1
		Public Debt by GDP	Debt_GDP_2015	2015	38 (LIE missing)	Public Debt in % of GDP This variable contains the cumulative total of all government borrowings less repayments that are denominated in a country's home currency. Public debt should not be confused with external debt, which reflects the foreign currency liabilities of both the private and public sector and must be financed out of foreign exchange earnings. Source: CIA World Factbook

Context						
		Number of local governments	Num_LG_year	1990-2014	39	The variable is situated with the variables of local autonomy. Source: LAI project 11 variables
		Difference in the number of local governments from 1990 to 2014	Num_LG_90_14	2014-1990	39 (34 in 1990)	The variable is situated with the variables of local autonomy. Source: LAI project 11 variables
		Difference in % in the number of local governments from 1990 to 2014	Pz_LG_90_14	2014-1990	39 (34 in 1990)	The variable is situated with the variables of local autonomy. Source: LAI project 11 variables
		Mean size of local governments in 1990	LG_meansize1990	1990	34	The variable is situated with the variables of local autonomy. Source: LAI project 11 variables
		Mean size of local governments in 2014	LG_meansize_2014	2014	39	The variable is situated with the variables of local autonomy. Source: LAI project 11 variables
		Ethnic fractionalization	ethnic_frac	1990	35	<p>Values from 0-1</p> <p>0= perfectly homogenous and 1= highly fragmented.</p> <p>Ethnic groups, which are larger than 1 percent of country population, including non-citizens. Ethnic distinction follows primarily by religion and under the assumption that membership follows in the groups is reckoned by descent by members and non-members.</p> <p>Source: Fearon, James D. (2003): Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country. Journal of economic growth, 8 (2), 1995-222</p>
		Cultural diversity	cultural_div	1990	35	<p>Values from 0-1</p> <p>Measuring the cultural distance between ethnic groups:</p> <p>1= The ethnic groups in the country speak highly similar languages</p> <p>0= The ethnic groups in the country speak structurally unrelated languages</p> <p>Source: Fearon, James D. (2003): Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country. Journal of economic growth, 8 (2), 1995-222</p>
		Country size: Surface area	AG.SRF.TOTL.K2	2014	39	Surface area (sq. km)

						Surface area is a country's total area, including areas under inland bodies of water and some coastal waterways. Source: Worldbank
		Country size: Land area	AG.LND.TOTL.K2	2014	39	Land area (sq. km) Land area is a country's total area, excluding area under inland water bodies, national claims to continental shelf, and exclusive economic zones. In most cases the definition of inland water bodies includes major rivers and lakes. Source: Worldbank
		Country size: Population	SP.POP.TOTL_year	1990, 2000, 2010, 2014	39; 39; 39; 39	Population, total Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship. The values shown are midyear estimates. Source: Worldbank
		Country size: Urban Population	SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS_year	1990, 2000, 2010, 2014	39; 39; 39; 39	Urban population (% of total population) Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices. It is calculated using World Bank population estimates and urban ratios from the United Nations World Urbanization Prospects. Source: Worldbank
		General Government total expenditure	NE.CON.GOV.T.ZS_year	1990, 2000, 2010, 2014	30; 38; 38; 37	General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) General government final consumption expenditure (formerly general government consumption) includes all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services (including compensation of employees). It also includes most expenditures on national defence and security, but excludes government military expenditures that are part of government capital formation. Source: Worldbank
		Independence year	year_of_indep	see description	39	Year of independence: For most countries the date is given on which the sovereignty was achieved and from which nation, empire, or trusteeship. For the other countries, the date given may not represent "independence" in the strict sense, but rather some significant nationhood event such as the traditional founding date or the date of unification, federation, confederation, establishment, fundamental change in the form of government, or state succession. For a number of countries, the establishment of statehood was a lengthy evolutionary process occurring over decades or even centuries. In such cases, the most significant date is cited. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook. /library/publications/the-world-factbook (date accessed, 8/82016)

		Government type	gov_type	see description	39	<p>Categorical:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Parliamentary republic 2) Federal parliamentary republic 3) Parliamentary constitutional monarchy 4) Federal parliamentary republic 5) Federal republic 6) Presidential democracy 7) Sem-Presidential republic 8) Constitutional monarchy <p>The variable provides the basic form of government for each country. The definitions of the major governmental terms can be found as follows: Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook. /library/publications/the-world-factbook (date accessed, 8/82016) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/docs/notesanddefs.html?fieldkey=2128&term=Government%20type</p>
		Predominant religion	pred_relig	see description	39	<p>Categorical:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Roman Catholic 2) Christian (Roman Catholic and Protestant) 3) Catholic 4) Orthodoxan Christian 5) Macedonian Orthodox 6) Eastern Orthodox 7) Evangelical Lutheran 8) Lutheran 9) Muslim 10) None <p>The predominate religion is defined by the size of adherents which exceeds 40 percent of total population. The year of the source varies from country to country. In some cases, the last estimated/census is from 2004. Others are more up-to-date. The core characteristics and beliefs of the world's major religions are described in detail at CIA Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook. /library/publications/the-world-factbook (date accessed, 8/82016)): https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/docs/notesanddefs.html?fieldkey=2122&term=Religions</p>

Other indices of decentralisation						
Regional Authority Index Source: Marks, Hooghe and Schakel (2016), original website http://www.falw.vu/~mlg/data.html (version of data 11.01.2015) Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, Arjan H. Schakel, Sandra Chapman Osterkat, Sara Niedzwiecki, Sarah Shair-Rosenfield (2016). <i>Measuring Regional Authority: A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance, Vol.I</i> , Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Published in book series "Transformations of Governance," eds. Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, and Walter Mattli).						
		Regional institutional depth (1-4)	RAI_instdepth_year	1990; 1995; 2000; 2005; 2010	25; 34; 34; 34; 35	The extent to which a regional government is autonomous rather than deconcentrated: 0: no functioning general-purpose administration at regional level 1: deconcentrated, general-purpose, administration 2: non-deconcentrated, general-purpose, administration subject to central government veto 3: non-deconcentrated, general-purpose, administration *not* subject to central government veto.
		Regional policy scope (0-4)	RAI_policy_year	1990; 1995; 2000; 2005; 2010	25; 34; 34; 34; 35	The range of policies for which a regional government is responsible: 0: very weak authoritative competence in a), b), c), d) whereby a) economic policy; b) cultural-educational policy; c) welfare policy; d) one of the following: residual powers, police, own institutional set-up, local government 1: authoritative competencies in one of a), b), c) or d) 2: authoritative competencies in at least two of a), b), c), or d) 3: authoritative competencies in d) and at least two of a), b), or c) 4: criteria for 3 plus authority over immigration or citizenship.
		Regional fiscal autonomy (0-4)	RAI_fiscauto_year	1990; 1995; 2000; 2005; 2010	25; 34; 34; 34; 35	The extent to which a regional government can independently tax its population: 0: central government sets base and rate of all regional taxes. 1: regional government sets the rate of minor taxes 2: regional government sets base and rate of minor taxes

						<p>3: regional government sets the rate of at least one major tax: personal income, corporate, value added, or sales tax</p> <p>4: regional government sets base and rate of at least one major tax.</p>
		Regional borrowing autonomy (0-3)	RAI_borrowauto_year	1990; 1995; 2000; 2005; 2010	25; 34; 34; 34; 35	<p>The extent to which a regional government can borrow:</p> <p>0: the regional government does not borrow (e.g. centrally imposed rules prohibit borrowing)</p> <p>1: the regional government may borrow under prior authorization (ex ante) by the central government and with one or more of the following centrally imposed restrictions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. golden rule (e.g. no borrowing to cover current account deficits) b. no foreign borrowing or borrowing from the central bank c. no borrowing above a ceiling d. borrowing is limited to specific purposes <p>2: the regional government may borrow without prior authorization (ex post) and under one or more of a), b), c), d)</p> <p>3: the regional government may borrow without centrally imposed restrictions.</p>
		Regional representation (0-4)	RAI_rep_year	1990; 1995; 2000; 2005; 2010	25; 34; 34; 34; 35	<p>The extent to which a region has an independent legislature and executive, which is the sum of assembly and executive.</p>
		Regional law making (0-2)	RAI_lawmaking_year	1990; 1995; 2000; 2005; 2010	25; 34; 34; 34; 35	<p>The extent to which regional representatives co-determine national legislation, which is the sum of law_a to law_f (see below for breakdown).</p>
		Regional executive control (0-2)	RAI_execon_year	1990; 1995; 2000; 2005; 2010	25; 34; 34; 34; 35	<p>The extent to which a regional government co-determines national policy in intergovernmental meetings:</p> <p>0: no routine meetings between central and regional governments</p> <p>1: routine meetings between central and regional governments without legally binding authority</p> <p>2: routine meetings between central and regional governments with legally binding authority</p>

		Regional fiscal control (0-2)	RAI_fiscon_year	1990; 1995; 2000; 2005; 2010	25; 34; 34; 34; 35	<p>The extent to which regional representatives co-determine the distribution of national tax revenues:</p> <p>0: neither the regional governments nor their representatives in a national legislature are consulted over the distribution of national tax revenues</p> <p>1: regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature negotiate over the distribution of tax revenues, but do not have a veto</p> <p>2: regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature have a veto over the distribution of tax revenues</p>
		Regional borrowing control (0-2)	RAI_borrowcon_year	1990; 1995; 2000; 2005; 2010	25; 34; 34; 34; 35	<p>The extent to which a regional government co-determines subnational and national borrowing constraints:</p> <p>0: regional governments are not routinely consulted over borrowing constraints</p> <p>1: regional governments negotiate routinely over borrowing constraints but do not have a veto</p> <p>2: regional governments negotiate routinely over borrowing constraints</p>
		Regional constitutional reform (0-4)	RAI_constit_year	1990; 1995; 2000; 2005; 2010	25; 34; 34; 34; 35	<p>The extent to which regional representatives co-determine constitutional change:</p> <p>0: the central government or national electorate can unilaterally reform the constitution</p> <p>1: a national legislature based on regional representation can propose or postpone constitutional reform, raise the decision hurdle in the other chamber, require a second vote in the other chamber, or require a popular referendum</p> <p>2: regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature propose or postpone constitutional reform, raise the decision hurdle in the other chamber, require a second vote in the other chamber, or require a popular referendum</p> <p>3: a legislature based on regional representation can veto constitutional change; or constitutional change requires a referendum based on the principle of equal regional representation</p> <p>4: regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature can veto constitutional change</p>
		Regional self-rule (0-18)	RAI_selfrule_year	1990; 1995; 2000; 2005; 2010	25; 34; 34; 34; 35	<p>The authority exercised by a regional government over those who live in the region, which is the sum of RAI_instdepth, RAI_policy, RAI_fiscauto, RAI_borrowauto, and RAI_rep.</p>

		Regional shared rule (0-12)	RAI_sharedrule_year	1990; 1995; 2000; 2005; 2010	25; 34; 34; 34; 35	The authority exercised by a regional government or its representatives in the country as a whole, which is the sum of RAI_lawmaking, RAI_execcon, RAI_fiscon, RAI_borrowcon, and RAI_constit.
		Regional Authority Index (0-30)	RAI_RAI_year	1990; 1995; 2000; 2005; 2010	25; 34; 34; 34; 35	Regional authority index, which is the sum of RAI_selfrule and RAI_sharedrule.
Other indices of decentralisation: Source: Schakel 2008 http://www.arjanschakel.nl/regauth_dat.html						
		Yvanyna and Shah's local government relative importance	Yvanyna_LG_RI	diverse	38	The relative importance of local governments is measured by share of LG expenditures (lg_expdec) in consolidated general government expenditures for all orders of government (GG) Source: Ivanyna and Shah (2014)
		Yvanyna and Shah's Local Government Security of Existence	Yvanyna_LG_SE	diverse	38	Local government security of existence is measured by LG independence (lg_indep). This measure attempts to capture the constitutional and legal restraints on arbitrary dismissal of local governments Source: Ivanyna and Shah (2014)
		Yvanyna and Shah's Fiscal Decentralisation	Yvanyna_FDI	diverse	38	The following variables are used to assess local government fiscal autonomy: LG vertical fiscal gap (lg_vergap) (Vertical fiscal gap refers to the fiscal deficiency arising from differences in expenditure needs and revenue means of local government), LG taxation autonomy (lg_taxaut) (This measure reflects upon a local government's empowerment and access to tools to finance own expenditures without recourse to higher level governments), LG unconditional transfers (lg_trans f) (Unconditional, formula based grants preserve local autonomy. Such grants are now commonplace yet conditional grants still dominate), LG Expenditure Autonomy (lg_expaut) and LG borrowing freedom (lg_borrow). Source: Ivanyna and Shah (2014)
		Yvanyna and Shah's Political Decentralisation	Yvanyna_PDI	diverse	38	Political decentralization refers to home rule for local self-governance. This is examined using the following criteria: LG legislative election (lg_legel), LG executive election (lg_exel) and Direct democracy provisions (lg_dirdem). Source: Ivanyna and Shah (2014)
		Yvanyna and Shah's Administrative Decentralisation	Yvanyna_ADI	diverse	38	Administrative Decentralisation, captured through LG HR policies (lg_hrpol). (Are LG able to conduct their own policies regarding hiring, firing and setting terms of local employment?) and LG employment (lg_empl) (share of LG

						employment in GG employment). Source: Ivanyna and Shah (2014)
		Yvanyna and Shah's Decentralisation Index	Yvanyna_DI	diverse	38	The aggregate Decentralisation Index The aggregate index (di) incorporates the relative importance of LG (measured by lg_expdec), the security of existence of LG (measured by lg_indep), and fiscal, political and administrative indexes. Source: Ivanyna and Shah (2014)
		Yvanyna and Shah's Government Closeness Index	Yvanyna_GCI	diverse	38	For the construction of the Government Closeness Index a complex weighting procedure is also followed. Source: Ivanyna and Shah (2014)
		Sellers and Lidström's Constitutional Protections on LA	Sellers_Local_Capacities_A	diverse	16	0 = no explicit or implicit constitutional protection; 1 = constitutional provisions furnish implicit means to assert local interests; 2 = explicit constitution guarantee of local authority. Source: Sellers and Lidström (2007)
		Sellers and Lidström's Corporate Representation for LGs	Sellers_Local_Capacities_B	diverse	16	0 = insignificant influence; 0.67 = limited influence; 1.33 = strong role, not formally institutionalized; 2 = institutionalized representative role (in constitution, laws). Source: Sellers and Lidström (2007)
		Sellers and Lidström's LG Employment as Percent of Public Employment (%)	Sellers_Local_Capacities_C	diverse	16	Source: Sellers and Lidström (2007)
		Sellers and Lidström's Politico-Administrative Capacities (Average)	Sellers_Local_Capacities_D	diverse	16	0 = lowest; 2 = highest. Source: Sellers and Lidström (2007)
		Sellers and Lidström's LG Expenditure as Proportion of Public Expenditure (%)	Sellers_Local_Capacities_E	diverse	16	Source: Sellers and Lidström (2007)
		Sellers and Lidström's Local Tax Revenue as Proportion of Total Tax revenues (%)	Sellers_Local_Capacities_F	diverse	16	Source: Sellers and Lidström (2007)
		Sellers and Lidström's Local Tax Revenue as Proportion of Total Tax revenues (%)	Sellers_Local_Capacities_G	diverse	16	0 = lowest; 2 = highest. Source: Sellers and Lidström (2007)

		Sellers and Lidström's Average of Fiscal and Politico-Administrative	Sellers_Local_Capacities_H	diverse	16	0 = lowest; 2 = highest. Source: Sellers and Lidström (2007)
		Sellers and Lidström's Local Supervisory Officials (Prefect or Equivalent)	Sellers_Supervision_A	diverse	16	2 = local administrative/supervisory official; 1 = local administrative official, elected locally or possessing limited powers; 0 = no local supralocal representative. Source: Sellers and Lidström (2007)
		Sellers and Lidström's Supralocal Appointment of Local Executive	Sellers_Supervision_B	diverse	16	2 = supralocal appointment of executive; 0 = local appointment Source: Sellers and Lidström (2007)
		Sellers and Lidström's Supralocal Control of Governmental Form	Sellers_Supervision_C	diverse	16	2 = supralocal determination of local structures; 1=significant but limited elements of local self-determination; 0=widespread local choices of government forms. Source: Sellers and Lidström (2007)
		Sellers and Lidström's Translocal Civil Service	Sellers_Supervision_D	diverse	16	2 = national civil service for local personnel with full coverage (job duties, tenure, discipline, rewards, closed recruitment); 1.6 = national civil service for local personnel with four of five items (job duties, tenure, discipline, rewards, closed recruitment); 1.2 = national civil service for local personnel with 3 of 5 items (job duties, tenure, discipline, rewards, closed recruitment); 0.8= national civil service for local personnel with two of five items (job duties, tenure, discipline, rewards, closed recruitment); or separate, national local civil service with job duties, tenure, discipline, rewards, closed recruitment; 0.4 = national civil service for local personnel with four of five items (job duties, tenure, discipline, rewards, closed recruitment); or separate, national local service with limited conditions; 0= separate local or other subnational civil service, without national rules. Source: Sellers and Lidström (2007)
		Sellers and Lidström's Politico-Administrative Supervision (Average)	Sellers_Supervision_E	diverse	16	2 = highest; 0 = lowest Source: Sellers and Lidström (2007)
		Sellers and Lidström's Grants as Percent of Local Revenue (%)	Sellers_Supervision_F	diverse	16	2 = Central or intermediate government sets rates, base; 1.60 = standardized or strictly limited rates with some discretion, but no discretion as to base; 1.20 = No discretion as to base, and range set for rates; or no discretion as to base, and diversion of revenues to other governments; or informal constraints on rates; 0.8 = no discretion as to base/assessment, or informal constraints on rates, or sharing; 0.4 = autonomy to set base/assessment, and procedural or insignificant constraints on rates; (e.g., requirement of local majority vote); 0 = full autonomy

						to assess and set rates. Source: Sellers and Lidström (2007)
		Sellers and Lidström's Local Tax Autonomy	Sellers_Supervision_G	diverse	16	2 = approval required; 1=Almost free; 0=Free, or requirement of local majority vote (from Council of Europe ratings). Source: Sellers and Lidström (2007)
		Sellers and Lidström's Supervision of Local Borrowing	Sellers_Supervision_H	diverse	16	Source: Sellers and Lidström (2007)
		Sellers and Lidström's Fiscal Supervision (Average)	Sellers_Supervision_I	diverse	16	Source: Sellers and Lidström (2007)
		Sellers and Lidström's Fiscal and Politico-Administrative Supervisino (Average)	Sellers_Supervision_J	diverse	16	Source: Sellers and Lidström (2007)
		Brancati's decentralization	Brancati_dcen	2000	14	A dummy variable in which countries are coded 1 for decentralized if they have regional legislatures with independent decision-making power over at least one issue area, and 0 for centralized if they do not Source: Brancati (2006), based upon International Monetary Fund's Government Finance Statistics
		Brancati's decentralization index	Brancati_dcen_index	2000	14	Four-point index based on whether or not regional legislatures are elected (1 point) and the types of issues (tax authority, education and public order/police (1 point per issue)) over which regional legislatures have control Source: Brancati (2006), based upon International Monetary Fund's Government Finance Statistics
		Brancati's decentralization index2	Brancati_dcen_index2	2000	14	Five-point index based on the four-point index plus one point whether regions must approve constitutions or constitutional amendments in order for them to become law in a country Source: Brancati (2006), based upon International Monetary Fund's Government Finance Statistics
		Brancati's Regional expenditures as a percentage of total government expenditures	Brancati_expshare	2000	8	Source: Brancati (2006), based upon International Monetary Fund's Government Finance Statistics
		Brancati's Regional revenue as a percentage of total government revenue	Brancati_revshare	2000	7	Source: Brancati (2006), based upon International Monetary Fund's Government Finance Statistics

		Brancati's RGI	Brancati_RGI	2000	14	Source: Brancati (2006), based upon International Monetary Fund's Government Finance Statistics
		Treisman's Structural decentralization	Treisman_VD_nb of tiers	Mid-90s	32	Structural decentralization (number of tiers) Treisman (2002)
		Treisman's Decision-making decentralization_Weak autonomy	Treisman_DD_Weak autonomy	Mid-90s	34	Decision-making decentralization (weak autonomy) Treisman (2002)
		Treisman's Decision-making decentralization_Residual authority	Treisman_DD_Residual authority	Mid-90s	34	Decision-making decentralization (residual authority) Treisman (2002)
		Treisman's Decision-making decentralization_Subnational Veto (non-financial)	Treisman_DD_Subnational Veto (non-financial)	Mid-90s	34	Decision-making decentralization (subnational veto, non-financial) Treisman (2002)
		Treisman's Decision-making decentralization_Subnational Veto (financial)	Treisman_DD_Subnational Veto (financial)	Mid-90s	34	Decision-making decentralization (subnational veto, financial) Treisman (2002)
		Treisman's Appointment centralization	Treisman_AD	Mid-90s	33	Index of Appointment decentralization Treisman (2002)
		Treisman's Electoral decentralization	Treisman_ED	Mid-90s	33	Proportion of subnational tiers with elected executive Treisman (2002)
		Treisman's Fiscal decentralization_Subnational share of budget spending	Treisman_FD_Subnational share of budget spending	Mid-90s	28	Fiscal decentralization (subnational share of budget spending) Treisman (2002)
		Treisman's Fiscal decentralization_Subnational share of tax revenues	Treisman_FD_Subnational share of tax revenues	Mid-90s	26	Fiscal decentralization (subnational share of tax revenues) Treisman (2002)
		Treisman's Personnel decentralization_Non-central share of total government employment	Treisman_PD_Non-central share of total government employment	Mid-90s	26	Subnational public employment share (early 1990s) Treisman (2002)