**Local Autonomy Index 2.0 (2015-2020): Norway (NOR)**

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The text below records and justifies the scoring of Norwegian municipalities on the Local Autonomy Index as modified in January 2020[[1]](#footnote-1). “Local autonomy” refers to the position of the lowest level of local government, often denoted as communes, municipalities, Gemeinden, etc. The index is composed of eleven indicators. The precise definitions of the indicators are given in the appendix. The scores presented are those for the year 2020. Developments between 2014 and 2020 are noted in the text and recorded in the accompanying scoring tables.

**Institutional depth 3**

A new Local Government Act was passed by Parliament in 2018. The Act did not entail any significant changes with regard to this indicator. The act confirmed the traditional position of Norwegian local government: municipalities may take on any functions not undertaken by other public bodies (in practice state bodies or county councils); this is also a long-standing historical tradition[[2]](#footnote-2). In addition, a series of special acts makes specific functions mandatory for local government, e.g. education, kindergartens, land use planning, etc. Furthermore, a constitutional clause on local government was adopted by Parliament in 2016; this entails no change in scoring on Institutional Depth since Norway already had a top score on this indicator; implications of these change are recorded for Legal Protection, however (see below).

**Policy scope 2**

EDUCATION

CODING 1.5

*Pre-school education* – score 0.5: Municipalities have responsibility for the availability of services (kindergartens) to children of age 1-6 (cf. Act on Pre-School Institutions, § 8 – *Barnehageloven*); it is a service to which all children are legally entitled; in practice, the service is in part provided by private (commercial) organisations and by voluntary associations; municipalities are responsible for overseeing the services provided by private and voluntary organisations. A score of 0.5 is given since municipalities have the overall responsibility for availability of services in this field but are not directly responsible for all personnel or buildings; the proportion of municipal to other personnel varies from one municipality to another according to the mix of municipal/private/voluntary supply. The service is financed by a combination of contributions from the state, municipalities and parents.

*Primary Education*  - score 1: Municipalities have full responsibility for primary education for 6-15 year olds as stipulated by the primary education act *(Lov om grunnskolen og den vidaregåande opplæringa- opplæringslova 1998, § 2-1 and § 13-1*). The responsibility includes the construction and maintenance of school buildings and hiring and paying teachers. Only a small minority of children in this age group go to private schools.

*Secondary education* – Score 0: this is a responsibility for the county councils, not the municipalities.

SOCIAL ASSISTANCE

CODING 2

*Economic assistance –* Score 0.5: The Act on Social Services and Welfare (*Lov om sosiale tjenester i arbeids- og velferdsforvaltningen - sosialtjenesteloven 2009***)** imposes obligations on municipalities regarding economic help to persons in destitute circumstances\* (§ 18), including access to affordable housing. Since 2001 these responsibilities are shared with the local bureaus of the National Employment Agency (NAV)[[3]](#footnote-3); therefore, only a score of 0.5 is recorded. \*according to national guidelines

*Work training* – score 0.5: The above Act also allocates responsibility to municipalities for programmes for work training for persons with reduced employment capacity (§ 29 - § 40). Similarily as above, since 2001 this responsibility is shared with the local bureaus of the National Employment Agency (NAV); therefore, only a score of 0.5 is recorded.

*Integration of refugees* – Score 1: At the national level, the Directorate of Immigration (UDI) is responsible for the administration of immigration. The Directorate allocates refugees granted asylum (permanent or temporary) to municipalities for residence and participation in integration programmes. The number of refugees allocated to a municipality is a matter to be negotiated and agreed between the Directorate and the municipality; in theory, the acceptance of refugees is voluntary on the part of the municipality. Participation in integration programmes is mandatory for refugees thus accepted while the Act on Introduction of Immigrants specifies a series of duties of municipalities in this regard (*Lov om introduksjonsordning og norskopplæring for nyankomne innvandrere (introduksjonsloven*), 2003, especially § 3 and 18). The programmes last for two years and include courses in Norwegian language and culture as well as work-related training. The municipal duties also cover refugees in temporary placement (mottak), cf. § 20 and § 21. The precise organisation and administration of the programmes are left to the municipalities to decide; the programmes are fully financed by the state, originally by special grants, but in later years grants have been incorporated into the general transfers.

HEALTH

CODING 1

*Primary health services –* Score 1: Based on the Act on Local Health and Caring Services municipalities are responsible for the availability of primary health services and for their organisation (*Lov om kommunale helse- og omsorgstjenester m.m. - helse- og omsorgstjenesteloven 2011*). The Act covers general medical services, emergency services, midwives, home nursing, health visitors, and public health programmes (§ 3-1 and § 3-2). General services are largely carried out by private general practitioners who run independent clinics but must have a contract with the municipality (*fastlegeordning*). Furthermore, since 2012 a co-management system for specialised health services has extended local government responsibilities for patients returning from hospitals (*samhandlingsreforma).*

*Hospitals –* score 0: Hospitals are the responsibilities of the state.

*Dental services –* score 0: Dental services are the responsibility of the county councils.

CARING

CODING 2.5

*General caring services*  – Score 1: The Act on Local Health and Caring Services assigns a general duty to municipalities for the supply of care for persons with reduced functional capabilities, including elderly persons (§ 3-1 and § 3-2); care may be provided by municipal personnel or by other organisations on contracts with the municipality (commercial or voluntary organsations). However, the bulk of services is provided by municipal personnel. Caring services cover home visitors, assisted homes (*omsorgsboliger*), nursing homes and personal assistants. Municipalities are responsible for developing regulations regarding eligibility for caring services in accordance with national guidelines, including the responsibility for keeping waiting lists for admission to nursing homes and other services.

*Special groups* – Score 1: Municipal responsibilities regarding the needs of special groups (e.g. various functional disabilities or children with special needs) are covered by the legislation quoted above. The municipality is required to work out an individual caring plan for each user in long-term care (§ 7-1).

*Child protection* – Score 0.5: Responsibility for the availability and organisation of the front line service is according to the Child Care Act allocated to municipalities, including staffing and facilities (*Lov om barneverntjenester – barnevernloven 1992, § 2-1*). However, institutions for permanent placement/custody are the responsibility of the state (§ 2-2 and § 2-3). Municipal staff, in cooperation with parents and the regional state authorities (*fylkesnemndene)* make decisions regarding the placement of children in difficult circumstances. Because of the division of responsibilities between municipalities and state institutions, a score of 0.5 is recorded.

LAND USE

CODING 2

*Zoning and building permits -* Score 2: The Planning and Building Act (*Lov om planlegging og byggesaksbehandling - plan- og bygningsloven* 2008) allocates a series of competencies to municipalities regarding local land use, including zoning and issuing building permits (i.a.§ 3-3 and § 11-7; § 12-1 mv. and § 20-1). Municipalities are the primary planning authorities for their respective territories although certain reserve powers remain with national authorities while regional authorities (county councils) have certain coordinating functions for issues that concern larger districts. A score of 2 since municipalities have the primary responsiblities in both fields of land use management and are staffed accordingly.

PUBLIC TRANSPORT AND HOUSING

*Public transport* – score 0.5: This is not a mandatory municipal function; the primary responsibility for public transport is allocated to the county councils. In and around the largest cities the state railway company is also an important service provider in local transport. Municipalities may take on supplementary functions, such as e.g. organizing special services for persons with disabilities or elderly people, or transport along routes or at hours not covered by regular public transport). The score is 0.5 since municipalities are only supplementary service providers.

*Housing –* 0.5: This is not an extensive municipal function in Norway; municipalities may take on responsibility for providing low-rent housing for people in economic distress or with disabilities (cf. Act on Public Health and Caring Services); this covers only a very small proportion of housing stock and eligibility is strictly on social criteria. In the larger cities, a substantial share of housing is offered through semi-public housing co-operatives; for the rest, housing is provided on commercial market terms; overall, around 80 per cent of all dwellings are owner-occupied. Although municipalities are free to engage in public housing projects in whichever way they prefer, only a score of 0.5 is recorded since this in practice is such a marginal function for municipalities. They may also lack the legal instruments required to act more forcefully in this area.

*Police* – score 0: This is not a local government function in Norway.

**Effective political discretion 3**

(cf. formulation of criteria of EPD; below, only reasons for *not* recording a full score of EPD are given).

EDUCATION

*Pre-School Education -* score 1

*Primary Schools* – score 1

*Secondary Schools* – score 0: Not a municipal function

SOCIAL ASSISTANCE

*Economic Assistance* – score 0.5: The function is carried out in cooperation with the National Welfare Agency.

*Work Training* – score 0.5: This function is shared with the National Welfare Agency.

*Integration of refugees* – score 1

HEALTH

*General/primary services*  – score 1

*Hospitals* – score 0: not a municipal function

*Dental services*– score 0: not a municipal function

CARING

*General caring*  – score 1

*Special groups* – score 1

*Child protection* – score 0.5 This function is shared and coordinated with national regional authorities.

LAND USE

*Zoning and building permits* – score 1.5: A reduced score is given owing to the extensive powers granted to national agencies and county councils to submit objections (*innsigelser*) to municipal land use plans and decisions (the Planning and Building Act § 5-4). Furthermore, municipal dispensations from existing land use plans may also be subject to objections and complaints and may thus be submitted to the county governors for scrutiny and consent. Powers of scrutiny and objection are granted in order to ensure that national objectives are sufficiently considered in local plans. In cases of persistent conflict a system of arbitration is in operation under the coordination of the county governors. Nevertheless, the powers of objection severely restrict the political discretion of local authorities. In recent years, ministers have issued orders to the respective national agencies to exercise restraint in the submission of objections. To what extent these orders have actually resulted in a lighter burden of national controls is still a matter of debate[[4]](#footnote-4). Since 2018, municipalities may demand adjudication through courts over the objections submitted by of national agencies (see also below under Legal Protection).

PUBLIC TRANSPORT AND HOUSING

*Public transport* - score 0,5; municipalities may provide supplementary services; see under Policy Scope.

Railway services are not provided by local govt.

*Housing* - score 1

POLICE

*Police* – score 0: This is not a local government function.

**Fiscal autonomy - score 1**

Municipalities are severely limited in their powers to set rates of taxes over which they have nominal powers. The most important source of revenue is the personal income tax, the upper rate of which is set by Parliament annually[[5]](#footnote-5). Furthermore, Parliament sets the upper rate of the income tax so that the tax, collectively for local government, yields a specified proportion of total local government revenues (for 2019, this objective was stipulated at 40 percent). Municipalities have somewhat more control over the property tax (they can influence the base as well as the rate), but this is a tax secondary to the personal income tax. However, for 2019 Parliament reduced the upper limit of the legal rate of the property tax, and the government has announced an intention of further reductions. A score of 1 is recorded for Norway on this indicator since all municipalities feel obliged to apply the highest rate for the income tax although, in theory, no lower limit is specified; however, municipalities claim that, given their legal duties, it would be difficult or impossible to meet obligations without applying the highest rate. A score of 1 is further justified in view of the limitations on the property tax recently introduced. Local taxes yield 42 per cent of all municipal revenues when the property tax is included although the proportion varies considerably across municipalities.

**Financial transfer system 3**

The proportion of *conditional* transfers amounted to around 16 % of total transfers[[6]](#footnote-6) in 2018; the proportion has rarely touched 20 % after the overhaul of the local govt. financial system in 1986. However, municipalities are increasingly concerned over the practice of “signaling” spending priorities to municipalities from ministries without basis in formally binding earmarking[[7]](#footnote-7); even so, municipalities do not necessarily take heed of such “signaling”, so this “practice” is not included in the proportion of conditional transfers recorded here.

The municipal share of total government expenditure is around 30 per cent in 2020.

**Financial self-reliance 3**

Own/local sources include personal income tax levied on local inhabitants, this is by far the most important local source of revenue; other sources include property tax (levied by 86 per cent of all municipalities in 2018) and fees and charges for specific services. In 2018, own sources yielded close to 60 per cent of total revenues. There is wide variety among municipalities as to how much they are financed through local sources, ranging from 80 per cent to 20 percent.

**Borrowing autonomy 2**

Borrowing does not require approbation by the state except in certain exceptional circumstances; furthermore, requirements **a** and **d** apply[[8]](#footnote-8). Before 2000, borrowing needed appropriation by the central government; therefore, a change in coding from 1 to 2 from 2000 on.

**Organisational autonomy 3,75**

Executives (*formannskapene*) are elected by the municipal council and the municipality may, furthermore, decide elements of the electoral system (e.g. whether to have elections over one or two days or the number of council seats within certain limits), plus municipalities hire own staff, decide organisational structure, fix salaries, may establish legal entities/enterprises. Organisational autonomy was substantially augmented with the revision of local government legislation of 1992 and following years. Therefore, until 1993 a score of 3 was recorded, thereafter 4 until 2014. However, in later years, national staffing norms have increasingly been imposed on local authorities by national decrees (e.g. in pre-schools or primary education)[[9]](#footnote-9), a development which limits organisational freedom; consequently, the score on the sub-criterion “choose their organisational structure and level of staffing” is reduced by 0.25 point.

**Legal protection 2**

Norway scored 0 on this indicator until 2015 because of no constitutional clauses on local government and no access for local government to adjudication or arbitration by independent bodies in cases of disputes about interpretations of legal texts regarding municipal duties. As mentioned above, a constitutional clause on local government was adopted in 2016; the formulation is brief, vague and general[[10]](#footnote-10); whether it will have any real impacts on central-local relations is uncertain; nevertheless, the clause is now there, and augments the score from 0 to 1 on the indicator Legal Protection.

Furthermore, the new local government act of 2018 recognized the right of local authorities to request adjudication in cases of disagreement with national authorities (*partsrettigheter*). Such cases arise in particular as a result of complaints from citizens over municipal decisions in their disfavour; the reviewing authority may review not only the legality of the municipal decision but also the exercise of discretion. Seen in connection with new regulations in the Act on Conflict Resolution (*tvistelova*) the new right to adjudication enables municipalities to bring such cases before the civil courts, and may thus result in having a stronger hand in processes against state agencies[[11]](#footnote-11). The new right raises the score with another 1 point. From 2019, the overall score on Legal Protection is 2.

It should be noted that Norway has no constitutional court; accordingly, there is no opportunity for local authorities to bring cases before a constitutional court. Consequently, there is no score to be obtained for Norway on this item. In Norway, issues of constitutionality are reviewed by the Supreme Court. There are, however, so far no cases of this nature brought before the Supreme Court by municipalities.

**Administrative supervision 1,75**

Formally, since 2001supervision aims at controlling only the legality of municipal decisions and service provision, but in practice supervision has become extremely detailed and extensive over the last decade. Researchers have argued that the concept of legality had been stretched through certain formulas in legal texts such as “municipal duty to provide adequate/appropriate/proper…etc. services”, which leave the judgement of local services to the evolving norms of professionals[[12]](#footnote-12) .

The new local government act of 2018 included some general guidelines for the relationship between central and local government that could potentially lead to more reticence in state agencies’ supervision of local government and review of citizen complaints, i. e. the principles of subsidiarity, proportionality and financial compensation for new obligations imposed on local government. These guidelines were already acknowledged in existing government directives on central-local relations without having the status of law[[13]](#footnote-13). Whether turning these guidelines into law will make any difference to actual, legislative or administrative practices remains to be seen.

Based on the formal status of supervision, a score of 2 could have been justified. However, the increasing intensity of supervision and the density of regulatory decrees in recent years suggest a somewhat reduced score.

 A score of 1,75 is recorded.

 **Central access 2**

There are no formal mechanisms of municipal representation at the central level, but a system of consultation with local government has been in operation since 2001; the system allows for deliberations between local and central government. The system is based on high-level meetings between the Norwegian Association of Local Authorities and the respective ministries; sometimes the prime minister is involved but mostly ministers with the relevant portfolios. It is an important channel of influence for local government. Code 1 before 2001, code 2 after.

**References**

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**Additional questions (2020 only)**

With these additional questions on the potential causal mechanisms and effects of local autonomy, we want to collect a current perception. More concretely, it means that it would be great if you could give us your answers to these questions directly here (i.e. no coding sheet), without considering any possible asymmetries in your country (i.e. national level only) or any changes over time (i.e. 2020 only). Any interesting (legal) indication may be also mentioned/added.

To better understand how an external shock may cause a change in local autonomy in a given country, a question is asked about the implication of Covid-19 pandemic.

The effects of local autonomy concern the satisfaction with local government service delivery, the importance of local government for citizens, the satisfaction with local democracy, the turnout at local elections and the trustworthiness of local politicians.

**Implication of Covid-19 Pandemic**

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| **Implication of Covid-19 pandemic** | *The extent to which the autonomy of local government has been impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic* | **0-3** | 0 local government autonomy has generally decreased with the Covid-19 pandemic1 local government autonomy has not been impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic2 local government autonomy in health has increased with the Covid-19 pandemic3 local government autonomy in health and in other fields related to the Covid-19 pandemic has increased |

The covid-19 situation has demonstrated the extensive powers conferred on local government by the Act on the Prevention of Contagious Deceases to combat contagious deceases. These powers may be applied by local authorities at their own discretion or in cooperation with national authorities However, local authorities have often preferred to wait for national guidance or instructions before acting on their own or adapting national guidelines to local conditions. No new powers or functions have been granted to local government related to the covid situation; existing powers are deemed to be sufficient; in some cases, local authorities may have been reluctant to apply all of their powers. Some cases of mutual blame games may be detected in the interactions of local and national authorities.

CODING: 1

**Satisfaction with local government service delivery**

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Satisfaction with local government service delivery** | *The extent to which the citizens are satisfied with local government service delivery* | **0-3** | 0 citizens are generally not satisfied at all with local government service delivery1 citizens are generally moderately satisfied with local government service delivery2 citizens are generally mostly satisfied with local government service delivery3 citizens are generally entirely satisfied with local government service delivery |

Citizens are in general fairly satisfied with public services in Norway, including those delivered by local government. Cf. *KS 2020: Status kommune: Der folk bor.*

CODING: 2

**Importance of local government for citizens**

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Importance of local government** | *The extent to which local government has an important role in the daily life of citizens* | **0-3** | 0 local government is not important at all in the daily life of citizens1 local government is somewhat important in the daily life of citizens2 local government is important in the daily life of citizens3 local government is very important in the daily life of citizens |

Given the municipal responsibility for major welfare tasks, and the size of the welfare sector in Norway, local government is very important in the daily life of citizens.

CODING: 3

**Satisfaction with local democracy**

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Satisfaction with local democracy** | *The extent to which the citizens are satisfied with local democracy* | **0-4** | 0 citizens are not at all satisfied with local democracy1 citizens are rather not satisfied with local democracy2 citizens are neither dissatisfied nor satisfied with local democracy3 citizens are rather satisfied with local democracy4 citizens are entirely satisfied with local democracy |

Citizens are fairly satisfied with local democracy in Norway. This is brought out in the series of reports on local democracy produced regularly in the wake of local elections by the Institute of Social Research in Oslo. The latest report available is titled *Lokalvalget 2015* (Abstakt Forlag, Oslo).

CODING: 3

**Turnout at local elections**

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Turnout at local elections** | *Electoral turnout at local elections (approximately, last general elections)* | **0-4** | 0 no elections1 between 1 and 25 %2 between 26 and 50 %3 between 51 and 75 %4 between 76 and 100 % |

Turnout in local elections has hovered around 60 % in recent elections. Turnout in the 2019 local election was 64,7 %.

CODING: 3

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Electoral participation on local level compared to electoral participation on national level** | *The extent to which electoral participation on local level is higher than on national level*  | **0-2** | 0 electoral participation on local level is generally lower than electoral participation on national level1 electoral participation on local and on national level are very much the same2 electoral participation on local level is generally higher than electoral participation on national level |

Participation issubstantially higher in national elections. Turnout in the national election of 2017 was 78 %.

CODING: 0

**Trustworthiness of local politicians**

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Perception of trustworthiness of local politicians** | *The extent to which local politicians are trustworthy* | **0-4** | 0 local politicians are not at all trustworthy1 local politicians are rather not trustworthy2 local politicians moderately trustworthy3 local politicians are rather trustworthy4 local politicians are very much trustworthy |

Citizens find local politicians to be” rather trustworthy” Cf. reports from Institute for Social Research mentioned above.

CODING: 3

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Perception of trustworthiness of local politicians compared to national politicians** | *Whether local politicians are more trustworthy than national politicians* | **0-2** | 0 local level politicians are generally less trustworthy than national politicians1 local and national politicians are similar in terms of trustworthiness2 local level politicians are generally more trustworthy than national politicians |

On the whole, citizens perceive local politicians as marginally more trustworthy than national politicians.

CODING: 2

1. Meeting by the Coordinating Group of Experts at the University of Lausanne, 29-30 January, 2020. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. For a general overview of Norwegian Local government, cf. e.g. Baldersheim, Harald and Lawrence E. Rose (2011). “Norway: The decline of subnational democracy?”, chapter 12 in J. Loughlin, F. Hendriks and A. Lidström, eds.: *Local and Regional Democracy in Europe.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. NAV: To styringslinjer. [https://www.nav.no/no/NAV+og+samfunn/Om+NAV/Relatert+informasjon/to-styringslinjer](https://www.nav.no/no/NAV%2Bog%2Bsamfunn/Om%2BNAV/Relatert%2Binformasjon/to-styringslinjer). Read 7feb19. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Riksrevisjonen (2019). Riksrevisjonens undersøkelse av behandling av innsigelser i plansaker. Dokument 3:7 (2018-2019). The number of annual objections from national agencies in the period of 2015 to 2017 amounted to around 1200, while the number of dispensations submitted for scrutiny was around 8.000 in 2017 (see op. cit. figures 5 and 6 and p. 79). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. For 2020 Parliament made the following decision: “§ 3-8.*Inntektsskatt til kommunene og fylkeskommunene.*

 Den kommunale inntektsskattøren for personlige skattytere og dødsbo skal være maksimum 11,10 pst.

Maksimumssatsene skal gjelde med mindre fylkestinget eller kommunestyret vedtar lavere satser.» Stortingsvedtak om skatt av inntekt og formue mv. for inntektsåret 2020 (Stortingets skattevedtak).

The rate of local taxes is stipulated so that local taxes finance a certain proportion of local government revenues: «På vanlig måte legges det opp til at de kommunale og fylkeskommunale skattørene for 2019 fastsettes ved behandlingen av statsbudsjettet for 2019. Det legges opp til at skattøren fastsettes på grunnlag av målsettingen om at skatteinntektene skal utgjøre 40 prosent av kommunenes samlede inntekter». Prop. 88 S (2017–2018)

Kommuneproposisjonen 2019, Kap 2.1. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Øyremerka tilskot i prosent av samla tilskot (rammtilskot pluss øyremerka tilskot). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Håkonsen, Lars, Per Kristian Roko Kallager og Trond Erik Lunder (2017), Statlige føringer på kommunenes frie inntekter. Hvilken betydning har de for kommunene? TF-rapport nr. 392 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. |  |
| --- |
|  § 60 - 9. Vedtak om å ta opp lån sendes departementet til orientering. Kommunale og fylkeskommunale låneopptak skal godkjennes av departementet i de tilfeller som er omhandlet i § 60.  |

Jf. Ot. Prp. Nr. 43 (1999 – 2000) Om lov om endringer i lov 25. September 1992. Nr. 107 om kommuner og fylkeskommuner m.m. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Kjell Harvold (2018). Bemanningsnormer og kompetansekrav. Kunnskapsstatus og intervju med rådmenn/økonomisjefer. NIBR-rapport 2018:5; KS (2018). Bemanningsnormer og kompetansekrav. Faktagrunnlag fra intervju med kommuner. KS-notat. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. §49 of the Constitution, 2nd section, now states that the citizens have the right to govern local affairs through locally elected bodies, and that detailed rules in this regard will be enacted through ordinary laws. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Kommunal- og moderniseringsdepartementet (2017). Styrker det kommunale selvstyret. Pressemelding. Dato: 10.03.2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Askim, Jostein, Harald Baldersheim, Jan Erling Klausen, Helge Renå, Eivind Smith, Hilde Zeiner (2013). Hvordan påvirker det statlige tilsynet kommunene og det lokale selvstyret? NIBR-rapport 2013:20 [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Stokstad, Sigrid og Signe Bock Segaard (2013). Forsvinner det kommunale selvstyret i statlig klagebehandling? Rapport KS 2013/Institutt for samfunnsforskning. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)